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THE PLATONIC AID ARISTOTELIAN
CRITICISM OF PHENOMENALISM
INTRODUCTION
1 . Purpose of the Thesis
The purpose of this thesis is to present a concentrated
study of the Platonic and Aristotelian theories of episte-
mology and metaphysics in their relationship to the doctrine
of phenomenalism.
This study has been motivated by two factors: 1) phe-
nomenalism is essentially an anti-metaphysical epistemologi-
cal doctrine; 1 and 2) the study of epistemology is of prime
importance to philosophy. ° Indeed, the gauntlet which Soc-
rates hurled when he ashed the climactic question, "What is
knowledge?","^ is still a challenge to philosophy. A study
of criticisms of phenomenalism is truly vital for "those
who try to see beyond appearance to the reality that is its
essence .
"
4
1
.
For a discussion of phenomenalism and its relation
to positivism and naturalism, see below, 2-3.
2. Brightman writes: "It appears to the present writ-
er that the best way to begin the study of philosophy prop-
er is to attempt to answer the question; How can we distin-
guish truth from error? No progress whatever can be made
in understanding our experience without some means of dis-
tinguishing what is true from what is not true." See his
ITP, 31 .
3. Theaet . , 146A.
4
.
V. E. Beck, BPR
, 330.
-.
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2. What is "Phenomenalism?"
Phenomenalism has been defined by Keir.rich Schmidt as
;
diejenige Richtung der Philosophie, welche
das in der Erfahrung Gegebene als "Erschein-
ungen" 'PhM.nomere) eines unerkennbaren "Dirges
an sich" betrachtet (objektiver Ph.),. oder als
wirklich Uberhaupt nur blosse Bewusstseir s-
phMnomene
(
"Erlebnisse," "Empf ir.dungen
" ) gelten
l H sst fextremer Ph.).?
In its extreme meaning, then, phenomenalism denies any and
all knowledge and reality beyond phenomena, and thereby lim-
its knowledge to appearance.' However, the term has also
7 .0
oeen applied to such systems as those of Kart ,
'
Comte, and
Spencer,
r
which limit knowledge to phenomena although the
reality of a thing-in-itself is rot denied.
The theory of phenomenalism has many philosophic simi-
larities to positivism and naturalism. 10 The Positive Phi-
losophy was first formulated by Auguste Comte. 11 His doc-
5. Schmidt, Pw, 317 . For other definitions, see
Dewey, Art.
(
1918 ), 288 , and Wood, Art. ( 1045), 23 1 .
6. The term "sensationalism" is usually applied to a
subvariety of empiricism which literally limits knowledge
to sensation. It was first associated with the philosophy
of Thomas Hobbes. See Hobbes, LEV, 131 .
7. See Jerusalem, ITP, 69. For Kant's use of the terms
"phenomenon" and noumeror," see his KrV, B35 , B299-315.
8. See Corate, PP, 28-29.
9. Spencer wrote of a "universal causal agent not to
be known at all." CS, 41
;
also, 31.
ir
.
"Realism," writes D. C. 0 'Grady, "is frequently
though not necessarily associated with a materialistic meta-
physic and with a scientific or empiristic attitude." In
this sense, the following discussion also includes realism.
See O' Grady, Art.(l 94 cr ), 636.
11. Comte's famous "law" taught a cultural evolution of
three stages: 1) the theological, in which natural events
were explained by anthropomorphic beings; 2) the metaphysical,
in which these beings became forces and essences; and 3) the
positive or scientific. See Corate, PP, 25-30.
'.
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trine stated that simple description of sensory phenomena
is the highest form of knowledge. Positivistic descrip-
tion is of the mathematical type, not psycho-analytic
psychology; hence, mathematical science is the highest stag
of human thought,^* Consequently, as Professor Patrick has
written:
Comte believed that the search for first causes,
ultimate reality, and all such things. Is wholly
vain. The human mind must confine itself to
actual facts, to phenomena
,
as we call them;
that is, to things as they appear in our actual
experience. It is useless to try to find out
what lies back of phenomena, about things in
themselves. Philosophy must limit itself to
discovering the relationships between phenom-
ena and their invariable modes of behavior. ^
3
Likewise, naturalism has certain relationships to phe-
nomenalism. Krikorian writes:
The naturalist turns away from these super-
natural worlds. For him there is no super
-
nature, no transcendental world. Beyond
nature there is [only] more nature,' 2*’
The world of nature, "the whole of reality"^ for the nat-
uralist, is examined and known by scientific method. The
naturalist no longer limits knowledge to literal appearance
as is indicated by such a concept as energy; but he does
"make a philosophy out of a method which excludes all facts
*12. Comte, PP, 25-30. Spencer’s agnosticism, which
limited knowledge to facts of matter and lorce, is very
similar to positivism. See Spencer, FP, 40-57.
13. Patrick, ITP, 37-
14 . Krikorian, Art. (1044), 243*
16
!
Science has long been recognized as positivistic.
But, asBurtt writes, "there is a change in the prevailing
conception ( 1 ) of reality, (2) of causality, and (3)
of
the human mind." See his MFMS, 300 , et passim, for a
com-
plete study of metaphysics and modern science.
,.
.
,
.
.
.
.
. j.
*
.
-
«
.
.
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except those accessible to our senses..." '
Thus phenomenalism
,
when used as a general term, is
applicable to any philosophy which denies or rejects knowl-
edge beyond appearance and, therefore, an ultimate or final
knowledge. Indeed, this very denial is the source of sirai-
1 £larity among pnenomenalists, positivists, and naturalists;
and it may be used as a criterion in attesting a phenome-
nalistic philosophical system.
3. Phenomenalism in Greek Philosophy
Yet this explanation is not sufficient for the purpose
of this study. The modern concept of phenomenalism was not
known in Greek philosophy, and the precise meaning of the
similar concept in Greek thought must therefore be deter-
mined. 19 As a Sophist doctrine, a theory of phenomenalism
had been formulated by Protagoras in his famous dictum:
Man is the measure of all things, of things
that are that they are, and of things that
are not that they are not. 20
This conclusion of Protagoras was maintained by the
Sophists. Protagoras, born in Abdera in 480 B. C., had
been instructed in his youth by Democritus, who first no-
ticed him because of his proficiency in knotting. 'With
17 . Brightman, DAV, 103. For a critical and more com-
plete analysis of scientific method and sensation in natu-
ralism, see ibid., 102-106.
18 . All naturalists cannot be included in this gener-
alization. Many naturalistic philosophers, especially of
the "new naturalism" school, are metaphysicians. See Sellars,
RCA, 243 , for a statement of metaphysics in "new naturalism."
10. The distinction between the phenomenal and noumenal
worlds became a problem after Kantls initial distinction.
See supra 2 , n. 7.
20. Bakewell, SBAP, 67 .
..
_
•
.
.
.
.
.
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Democritus, Protagoras held the existence of the Many and
rejected the One of the Eleatics; he accepted the theory
that thought has its origin in sensation. From Heraclitus
he accepted 21 the doctrine of the "flux ." 22
Protagoras differed sharply with Democritus* atomic
theory, however, and consequently with his theory of reflec-
tion. 2^ The rejection of Democritus' atoms ultimately led
Protagoras to the belief that sensation is the source of
xnowledge
;
24 and Protagoras' own theory of perception was
largely responsible for his rejection of both these Demo-
pc^
critean theories/'
The Sophists openly recognized that this doctrine im-
plied a relative knowledge: they were skeptical, and
taught2^ the relativity of both knowledge and morals. 2^
Ultimate knowledge of reality was declared unattainable;
and when they turned to morals, they held that these too
had only a contingent basis. 2 ^' Thus the Sophists
21 . The influence of Heraclitus on Protagoras is a
debatable issue. See below, 1^-16,
22. For a complete biography of Protagoras, see Lewes,
HOP, I, 120-126.
23. See Aristotle, De An , 405a , for a statement of
Democritus' conception of the mind. His atomic theory is
expressed in the statement, "Only the atoms and the void
are real." Bakewell, SBAP, 60 .
24. "The relativity of knowledge is a truism to us,
but was a great psychological discovery in the fifth century
before Christ. Of this discovery the first distinct asser-
tion is contained in the thesis of Protagoras." Jowett
(tr. and ed
.
) , DP 1 , IV, 25^.
.
. , ,
25. Protagoras' theory of perception is examined below,
1 o
26. For a discussion of the Sophists as teachers, see
Mackay (tr. and ed
.
) , SP, 4-17 • . _
27 . The meaning of this relativity is discussed below,
*28. "For man there was no Eternal Right Decause there
was no Eternal Truth..." Lewes, HOP, I, 125*
.*
.
c
'•*
.
. ,
Introduction 6
maintained the doctrine of Thought being
identical with and limited to Sensation.
Now this doctrine implies that everything
is true relatively
--every sensation is a
true sensation; and as there is nothing
but sensation, knowledge is inevitably
fleeting and imperfect.^-
The Sophists were consistent skeptics;^ it was they
who first demonstrated that sense-knowledge leads only to
skepticism.^ 1 Thus it is evident that the Sophists, as
well as the positivists of whom Professor Patrick writes,
believed "that the search for first causes, ultimate real-
^52
ity, and all such things, is wholly vain."^ The Sophist,
positivist, and naturalist are alike in their rejection of
knowledge beyond phenomena and their skeptical attitude
toward metaphysics.
The uniting lirk between the ancient Sophists and the
modern naturalists and positivists is stronger than it
might appear: F. C. S. Schiller, a modern pragmatist, has
termed himself a disciple of Protagoras because the latter
v/as the first philosopher to teach that one opinion can be
better than another, though it cannot be truer
. 33 There is
2?. Lewes, HOP, I, 121 . The meaning of this observa-
tion in ethics is discussed below, 12-13.
30 . Two technical distinctions must oe made here:
1) phenomenalism does not necessarily imply sensationalism,
although Plato interpreted Protagoras' saying in this way;
and 2) strictly, skepticism is the denial of the existence
of any truth whatever. Nevertheless, the term is often
used to mean that knov/ledge is human, i. e., it is always
relative, never absolute. See Cushman, BHP
, 69. Sophistic
skepticism is discussed below, 11-14.
31 . English philosophy from Locke to Hume again demon-
strated this fact.
32 . This generalization is not accurate: Prodicus,
one of the Sophists, woe not the skeptic that Protagoras and
Gorgias were. See Zeller, OHGP, 83“85 •
33. Schiller, HUM, xvii . For a fuller discussion of
Schiller's thought, see below, 13 - 14 .
,
Introduction
no doubt but that these modern schools of thought represent
a continuity-refined though it may be—with the ancient
Sophie ts
.
4
.
Phenomenalism as a Problem in Philosophy
To the ancient Greek speculative mind, the doctrine of
phenomenalism was a disturbing element of thought. The
temperament of the Greeks could not yet admit to a doctrine
of "flux," and still less to the position that "knowledge
is inevitably fleeting and imperfect ."^ 4 "Being in love
with the fixed, the secure, the immutable, the early
Greeks, and especially Plato, longed for an epistemology
which taught the security, attainability, and eternality of
knowledge, and a method of distinguishing the true from the
false . 36 "The chief interest of all is the quest for what
is abiding in the flux of things ."^ 7
Thus phenomenalism was as truly a problem in Greek phi-
losophy as it is in modern philosophy. Indeed, the whole
epistemological problem is of greatest importance in con-
temporary thought. 3urtt writes:
What are the problems whose correct treatment,
it has generally been taken for granted, con-
stitute Qsic]] the main business of metaphysi-
cal thinkers? Well, most conspicuous of these
is the so-called problem of knowledge; the
34. Supra, 6 . "The beginnings of sceptical doctrine
with the Greek sophists owed their form largely to the crude
and undeveloped condition of logical and metaphysical theory
at that time," writes Bowne. See his TTK, 271 -2? 4 > for &
discussion of this issue.
35. A phrase from Larrabee , RE, 21 .
36. Although the very existence of skepticism and
Sophism in Greek thought demonstrates that these statements
were not universally applicable, the main tenor of Greek
thought is contained therein. See, e. g., Bergson’s analy-
sis of Greek philosophy in his CE, 348-349.
37. Burnet, EGP, 12.
-•
•
*
•
.
,
•
.
•
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main current of speculative inquiry from
Descartes onward has been permeated by the
conviction that investigation into the na-
ture and possibility of knowledge forms a
necessary preliminary to a successful at-
tack upon other ultimate issues... The
central place of epistemology in modern
philosophy is no accident; it is a most
natural corollary of something still more
pervasive and significant, a conception of
man himself, and especially of his relation
to the world around him. 3 ?
Likewise, skepticism, in any of its various forms, has
been, and still is, an important problem in philosophy.
Bowne has written that:
In the form of philosophic scepticism this
doubt [the validity of knowledge^ has been
an important factor in the history of
thought
.
3 °
Thus a study of the skeptical phenomenalism of Greek
thought is of value both in understanding the philosophy of
the ancient Greeks and in recognizing and judging the skep-
ticism In certain schools of modern thought.
5. Bibliographical Note
The method of this thesis has been 1) to analyze Plato*
and Aristotle's writings, and 2 ) to consult reference works
for their interpretations of these two philosophers. Lost
of the standard studies of Plato's and Aristotle's theories
of knowledge are listed in the bibliography.
The literature on Plato and Aristotle is so extensive
that a complete list of secondary sources is almost impos-
sible; this is also not necessary. Secondary sources used
38 . Bur 1 1 , MFMS , 1 -2 .
30. Bowne, TTK, 26?.
. . .
•
•
*
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in this study have been selected for the accuracy and clarity
of their presentations of the epistemological problem.
Jowett's translation of Plato's Dialogues (DP-) and
McKeon (ed.), BWA, have been used as primary sources. The
explanation of the standard abbrieviations used in the foot-
notes of the text is given in the bibliography.
.
CHAPTER I
1C
THE MEANING OF HOMO LIENSURA OIIKIUM
A study of Protagoras’ doctrine^ that ’’Man is the
measure of all things" ( homo men sura omnium ) is necessary
for the purpose of this thesis because Plato was not an al-
together trustworthy interpreter of the doctrine. Jowett
remarks
:
There are two special difficulties which beset
the student of the Theaetetus
; (i) he is un-
certain how far he can trust Plato’s account of
the theory of Protagoras; and he is also doubt-
ful (2) how far, and in what part of the dia-
logue, Plato is expressing his own opinion.
*
1
.
Evaluation of Homo Men sura Omnium
Socrates, despite his great opposition to the Sophist
movement, nevertheless displayed great similarity with the
Sophists. He was motivated by the same general doubt as
they: be was a doubter. "Philosophy begins in wonder,
wrote Plato; and both the Sophists and he "wondered." And,
much like them, because he had been "defeated in his endeav-
or to penetrate the world without, he turned his attention
1 . Supra, 4 . Because of the continual reference to
this statement throughout the thesis, documentation of it
is dropped below.
2. Jowett. (tr., and ed.)., DP', IV, 234 .
3. Theae t . ,' 155D. For a discussion of the similarity
between the Sophists and Socrates because of their question-
ing attitudes, see Pater, PAP, 99-IC3.
..
. .
..
!
'
.
•
I. The Meaning of Homo Mensura Omnium 1 1
to the world wj thin
.
1,4
The chief difference between Socrates and the Sophists
lay in their attitudes toward the central truth of philos-
ophy. The homo men sura at first glance might be considered
Socratic, for Socrates did put the laws of conduct to the
test of experience. But, as More points out, "this indeed
would be the case, were it not for the utterly diverse mean-
ings that may be attached to the word 'man'."' Protagoras
meant by 'man* such qualities as sensations and tempera-
ment, and thereby denied the law based on the single notion
of Good which Socrates considered unchanging ("It is better
for a man to be just than unjust"), 0 and the test to which
he applied ethical conceptions.
Socrates therefore attacked the Sophists for their
denial of his basic premise. Sidgwick summarizes his attack
thus
;
The charge that Socrates brought against the
sophists and his fellow-men generally may be
viewed in two aspects. On one side it looks
quite artless and simple; on the other it is
seen to herald a revolution in scientific
method, and to contain the germ of a metaphys-
ical system. Simply stated, the charge was
that they talked about justice, temperance,
law, etc., and yet could not tell what these
things were; the accounts of them which they
gave when pressed were, as Socrates forced
them to admit, inconsistent with their own
judgments on particular instances of justice,
4. Lewes, HOP, I, 142-143*
5. More, PLA, 17.
6. The dialogues are full of references to justice as
the human virtue. See, e. g.. Rep., 3353 *
..
.
.
X
.
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I. The Meaning of Homo Mensura Omnium 12
7legality, etc
.
1
There are four problems which arise in the comparison
of Socrates and the Sophists. They are: 1) the role of
universale in ethics; 2) Protagoras' view of universals;
3) the fundamental monism-dualism problem; and 4) the rela-
tion between truth and personality.
1) A universal is defined as "that term which can be
Q
applied throughout the universe." This implies that an
ethical universal is that which is applicable to all men
at all times under all conditions. Kant's categorical
imperative is an example of an ethical universal. 0
2) Protagoras did not hold such an ethical universal;
indeed, he taught no universals. 10 This was the logical
result of his theory of perception: 11 between knowledge and
an object are the senses and the mind; therefore, man can
never know things exactly as they are, and the individual's
own physical body determines what he will or will not know.
Yet, because no individual can know an object, it follows
that no one can refute the opinion of another: no individual
has knowledge of the actual object.
Thus in ethics, Protagoras' theory of perception led
him to the view that "good" is not a universal, in the sense
7. Sidgwick, OHE, 22-23. Thus there is a difference
between Socrates' skepticism and that of the Sophists.
Socrates held a type of "methodological skepticism" while
the Sophists taught an "epistemological skepticism."
3. Feibleman, Art. (1045), 326 .
o, See his KrV, B575
.
10. Except the universality of homo mensura omnium .
11*. See Bertocci, SAMP, 22. for a concise statement of
this theory.
12. Such, at least, is Plato's interpretation. See
below, 15 - 16 , for a discussion of his accuracy. Taylor
..
.
.
.
I. The Meaning of Homo Mensura Omnium 13
that the good for one man will be good for another, or that
even the same good will be good for the same man at differ-
ent times. This means that "good" is not a universal, but
a particular.
3) The struggle between the Platonic ethical universal
s
and Protagoras' particulars has been identified by More with
the struggle between dualism and monism, between knowledge
and opinion, and just opinion. Plato agreed with Protagoras
that man moves in a "world of shifting impressions," but
rather than stopping in this world of opinion, Plato urged
that there is also a world of knowledge in which man can
attain certain information of the everlasting--in which
there is a universal good for all men at all times.
4) G-. E. Moore writes that:
Protagoras appears to have drawn the contra-
dictory conclusion that all our beliefs may
be not partially, but wholly untrue, as is
implied in his stating his theory with re-
gard to all things. 1 3
The problem of the relation between truth and personality is
apparent: if truth is not correspondence with reality becaus
of the interference of the senses and mind, what then is
truth?
The humanist Schiller has conceived truth on the basis
of Protagorean particulars. Schiller rejected the corres-
pondence criterion of truth because "Thought and Reality can-
points out in this regard that "the view Plato ascribes to
Protagoras is not 'subjectivism.' The theory is strictly
realistic..." His thesis is metaphysical, and he is denying
a "common environment." PMW, 326 .
13 . Moore, Art. (1918), 451.
..
.
.
*
.
'
.
I. The Meaning of Homo Men sura Omnium 14
not he got apart, and consequently the doctrine of their
'correspondence' has in the end no meaning." 14 Coherence
is rejected because "the pronouncement that truth is what
fits in a system as therefore final would be ludicrously
rash. .
.
,,15 Schiller's conclusion is that "Truth is a form
16
of value ;" ' "anything may commend itself to anybody, as 'true,
nay, even as the truth, and there are no guarantees that any
man's valuations will be consistent with any other man's, or
even with his own at other times. n1 ^
Thus the Protagorean doctrine is identified with the
view that truth is a value, and a value which cannot be proved
true or false. As truth itself is a value which refers to no
1
8
common factor in anybody's experience, ' and since the claims
of ethics can be examined only with reference to this value,
ethical universals necessarily melt away. Truth becomes a
function of each situation and each personality.
Homo aensura omnium may now be characterized as: 1) the
theory that reality cannot be known, i. e., that there can
be only opinion, and no knowledge; 2) the belief that any
kind of universal is meaningless; 10 and 3) the theory that
truth is no more than a value, and what is true consequently
depends on the valuer. Such is the view against which
Socrates argued.
14. Schiller, HUM, 46.
15. Ibid., 47. Finality is not the claim of coherence,
however. See Brightman, ITP, 63~66 .
16. Schiller, HUM, 54.
17. Ibid., 55.
IS. The experience of truth as a value is not ordinarily
denied (see Brightman, PR, 00 ; note the exceptions to, and the
interpretation of, truth as a value discussed taere)
.
Tuis
statement implies that there is nothing in truth but value.
1
ri
t
However, see supra, 12, n. ic.
.*
.
*
*
.
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2 . Plato's Interpretation of Homo Mensura Omnium
Socrates identified Theaetetus' first defirition of
knowledge, "knowledge is perception," with Protagoras'
theory. Although scholars have questioned the accuracy of
this identification, it seems apparent tha t Protagoras did
"regard knowledge as consisting in the immediate app rehen
-
sion of things."’’
If this is true, there is yet an ambiguity in the dic-
tum. Did he mean that knowledge is relative to the human
mind, or did he deny the existence of an external, objectiv
criterion of truth, * or is such a criterion in the human
mind?
These questions must go unanswered. The evidence con-
cerning the meaning which Protagoras really ascribed to his
O ~z
theory is all too meager. Jowett concludes that:
Probably he had no intention either of denying
or affirming an objective standard of truth.
He did not consider whether man in the higher
or man in the lower sense was a 'measure of
all things.' Like other great thinkers, he
was absorbed with one idea, and that idea was
the absoluteness of perception. 24
Another important aspect of Protagoras' theory is the
suspected influence of Heraclitus' "flux" on his thought.
Fuller says that "these conclusions £of Protagoras] were
enforced by, if not actually based upon the Keraclitean
20 . Theaet . , 1 5 i E
•
21 . Watson, OP, 305.
22 . See Jowett (tr. and ed
.
) , DP , IV, 258, for an in
vestigation of these problems. Schiller's view indicates
that Protagoras did deny this criterion. Supra, 14 .
23 . With the exception of a few fragments, Protagoras
oook, On Truth
,
has been lost.
24
.
Jowett (tr. and ed
.
) , DP , IV, 258.
..
,
r-
.
.
.
.
I. The Meaning of Homo Mensura Omnium 1C
teaching,"' Jowett, however, claims "that the connection
between the doctrines of Protagoras and Heraclitus was not
generally recognized in Greece, hut was really discovered or
invented by Plato. Ueberweg concludes, "It remains un-
certain how far the manner in which Protagoras established
this proposition agreed with that which we find reported in
Plato's Theae tetus . "~
7
Thus it becomes evident that Plato's interpretation of
homo mensura omnium is not necessarily the most accurate
that could be made. It must therefore be remembered with
Jowett that "we are criticizing the Protagoras of Plato,
and not attempting to draw a precise line between his real
2 p
sentiments and those which Plato has attributed to him."
25. Fuller, HOP, 105.
26 . Jowett (tr. and ed
. ) ,
DP 1
,
IV, 2?1 t Pater indi-
cates that there is an attempt in Heraclitus "to reduce
the world of chaotic mutation to cosmos," despite Plato's
attach on the doctrine for the lacK of such an effort.
But, Pater observes, Plato "was no scholar of the Sophists
as he understood them, but is writing of what he really
knows." PAP, 17 » 123.
27. Ueberweg, HOP, 77.
2 P . Jowett (tr. and ed
.
) , DP, IV, 231.
..
.
.
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PLATO'S CRITIQUE OF PHENOMENALISM
Plato's criticisms of phenomenalism 1 are collected and
analyzed in the Theaetetus . In this dialogue he was attempt-
ing -to gather up all the skeptical tendencies of his day and
compare them. The theory that "knowledge is sensible percep-
tion" is, as Jowett writes, "the antithesis of that which
derives knowledge from the mind (Theaet., 185 ) or which
assumes the existence of ideas independent of the mind (Par.,
2
255 )." Although Plato did not offer a constructive theory
of knowledge in this dialogue, he did subject his contem-
poraries' theories to severe criticism from the point of
view of his own epistemology.^
1
.
"Knowledge is Perception"
Theaetetus had been complimented by Theodorus for his
keen intellect and wisdom when Socrates asked the question
whose answer became the goal of the dialogue. In reply to
the question, "Vfhat is knowledge?", Theaetetus answered
that he considered the sciences to be knowledge . 4 Socrates
1. Throughout the remainder of this study, the term
phenomenalism is used without further qualification. For
the meaning of the term as used here and below, see supra,
10-14.
2 . Jowett (tr. and ed
. ) ,
DP 1
,
IV,. 234 .
3 . Plato's theory of knowledge is discussed below,
28-40
.
4 . Theaet . , 1 46C
.
..
.
.
I
'
.
.
II. Plato’s Critique of Phenomenalism 18
rejected this statement, however, because it is an enumera-
c;
tion, not a definition,
Theaetetus' first true definition was, "knowledge is
perception."" Socrates immediately identified this defini-
tion with Protagoras’ saying, homo mensura omnium
.
Fol-
lowing this identification, Socrates proceeded: 1 ) to draw-
out the implications of the theory, and 2 ) to interpret the
theory in view of the Heraclitean "flux," upon which he
pthought Protagoras' theory rested.
i. The Confusion of Sensation with Opinion and Knowledge
The first implication of the theory that "knowledge is
perception" is that "things are to you such as they appear
to you, and to me such as they appear to me, and that you
o
and I are men;"' in other words, things actually are as
they appear to each man. Socrates' inference depended on
his theory of sensation: sensation is the result of a mo-
tion arising from the eye which meets the color of an ob-
ject .^ 0 The properties of the motion from the eye depend on th
percipient, and differ from one individual to another; indeed,
they may differ in the same individual from time to time.
5 . Theaet . , 1 46D
.
6 . Told., 148E.
7 . Ibid., 1 52A. A similar identification of this defini-
tion of knowledge and Prota.goras' dictum is found in Crat . ,
152A.
8
.
For a discussion of Plato's accuracy in interpreting
Protagoras' "hidden meaning," see supra, i c ~i 6 .
10 ! ifeid.
,
154 A. The theory of the origin of the sensible
faculties is found in Tim., 42A-43. Cf . Protagoras' theory of
sensation, supra, 1 ?,
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Therefore, different individuals see the same object dif-
ferently, ^ and nothing perceived by different men or by
1 ?the same man at different times is the same.
The fundamental principles involved in this analysis
have been summarized by Taylor;
Thus tne issue between realism and "absolute
phenomenalism" is rightly made to be just
whether two men, each using his own private
senses, can perceive an object which is "com-
mon" to both of them
.
^
But, granting the principles of "absolute phenomenalism,"
Socrates discovered certain contradictions arising from the
relations of numbers;
Here are six dice, which are more by a half
when compared with four, and fewer by a half
than twelve— there are more and also fewer. 4
The cause of this difficulty, Socrates maintained, is that
"knowledge is perception" violates the laws of thought.
They are;
first, that nothing can become greater or
less, either in number or magnitude, while
remaining equal to itself... Secondly, that
without addition or subtraction there is no
increase or diminuation of anything, but
only equality... Thirdly, that what was not
before cannot be afterwards without becoming
and having become. 1 ^
Socrates’ argument here has called "attention to the,
so far neglected, distinction between sensation and thought,'
and he has attempted to present certain contradictions
which arise when this distinction is neglected, vfild has
11. Theaet . , 154A. 14 . Theae t. , 154C.
12 . Ibid., 1 C4B. ’ I?. Toid., 155 A*
13. Taylor, PMW, 332, n. 1 . 16 . Taylor, PMW, 338.
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written that:
»«hen sensation is correctly understood, the
assertion of sensory infallibility is aharmless truth. But when sensation is con-fused with "judgment" or "opinion," a rad-ically different faculty, the assertion of
'sensory" infallibility breeds those sensa-
tional paradoxes wrhich have made Protagoras
and many of his empirist followers famous,
ii . Sensation and the "Flux"
The Heracli teans
,
Socrates held, taught that all things
«
p
are in motion. This motion is of two kinds, active and
1 °passive. Active motion, which is the "swifter" kind, is
locomotion; passive, the "slower" motion, is motion "in the
on
same place." Applying this theory to vision, Socrates
inferred that all things are becoming relative to something
else: "there is no self-existent thing, but everything is
becoming and in relation; and being must be altogether abol-
2
1
ished..." All things arc becoming and in relation, in-
cluding classes, species, and genera. Thus, concluded
Socrates, "my perception is true to me, being inseparable
from my own being; and, as Protagoras says, to myself I am
judge of what is and what is not to me." 22
17 . Wild, PTM, 247 .
18. The following discussion of Heraclitus' theory is
Platonic, and does not interpret Heraclitus accurately. The
theory of the "flux" contained two premises; i) all things
are in motion, but 2 ) law controls the motion. See Bertocci,
S£MP
, 10 , for this presentation of Heraclitus' views. Plato's
error occurred in his interpretation of the Logos .
19 . Theaet . , 156A. See Laws X, 893-894, for a list of
ten kinds of motion, and Tim
., 561), 38C, and 43D, for a list
of six types of motion .
20 . Theaet . , 156D.
21
.
Ibid
. ,
157B.
22 . Ibid., 16OD. See Pater, PAP, 5-50 for a complete
statement of Plato's historical relations with the doctrines
of rest and motion.
..
.
•
.
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The first arguments which Socrates advanced against
the theory that knowledge is perception of the world of
"flux" are mainly reductio ad absurdum . Why, he asked, did
not Protagoras make a pig or a dog-faced baboon the measure
of all things, for they too have sensation? 2^ Secondly, he
wondered why Protagoras was considered wise and was highly
Paid for his instruction, for each man is a measure of his
own wisdom, Thirdly, Socrates considered memory: on
Protagoras' principle, what is remembered is not known, for
when one is remembering, he is not seeing, and., therefore,
not knowing. 2 - Fourthly, Socrates argued that a man can
know and not know at the same time; for if he sees with one
26
eye covered, he knows with one eye and not with the other.
Socrates, however, was not satisfied with this type of
argument, and proposed a new start. He reviewed. Protagoras'
arguments and concluded for Protagoras: "What I maintain
is, that sensations are relative and individual, that con-
i
sequently what appears is." 2 ^ Having redefined the Issues,
Socrates proceeded with the refutation
.
iii . The Confusion of Knowledge with Sensation
The fundamental issue in Socrates' argument was; given
the Protagorean thesis, what becomes of mind.? On the basis
of Protagoras' (and Heraclitus') premises as he interpreted
them, Socrates made three deductions: 1) in sensation, the
23. Theaet., 1613. 25. Ibid., 164A. 27. I3id., 1663.
24. Ibid., 16 IE. 26. Ibid., 1 6
5
B •
..
.
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percipient and the object lose their identity: they merely
come together to "generate sensations" and have no "abso-
28
lute existence." 2) Since each quality moves in place
and changes at the same time, one name is no more appropri-
ate than another. ' 3) Seeing and not-seeing are identical,
and therefore knowledge is both perception and not percep-
tion
.
3°
These conclusions, Socrates argued, are not correct, for
the mind has become a meaningless and non-existent thing.
Therefore, he made four observations on sensation which be-
came fundamental in his own epistemology: 1) sensible ob-
3 1jects are perceived with the mind through the senses p
2) general notions are perceived with the mind only, without
the help of the senses;^ 2 3) the senses perceive objects of
sense, but only the mind can compare them; J and 4) sensa-
tion is given at birth, but truth and being are acquired
only by reflection later on,^4
The chief argument against Protagoras' theory is that
it denies the possibility that one man can know more than
28. Theaet., 182A.
29 . Ibid., I82D. A fuller exposition of the sophisti-
cal view of names is found in Cra t . , 384-387 .
30. Theaet . , I83A. The principle of rest is of great
importance for Plato
;
indeed, without rest, he held that
mind could not exist. Cf . Soph . , 24pC.
31 . Theaet., 184E. A detailed study of the mechanisms
of sense perception is given in Tim., 66 .
32. Theaet . , 1S5C. The attainment of true being, a
fundamental principle in Plato's thought, is gained only by
the mind, without the aid of the senses. The senses can oe
a hinderance which would prevent the soul fro.:, attaining
true being. Phaedo, 65D-66A.
33 Theaet., 1863 . Gf. Protag . , 356b*
34 *. Theaet., 1 86D . PlatoThought that reflection is
aroused by the contradictions of sense. Rep . 523-*
*
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another. Thus, Protagoras acknowledged the truth of his
adversaries and denied the truth of his own doctrine.-^"
Socrates did make a concession, however: Protagoras' posi-
tion is true in respect to sensible things. Yet Protagoras
did not limit his theory to sensible things alone: he ac-
knowledged the wisdom of some men in politics.
Socrates thought that this refutation was complete be-
cause he had established the existence of something in the
Knowing process which is above sensation .^ 0 "Hence it fol-
lows that 'knowledge' is not to be sought for in the affec-
tions of our sensibility but in the mind's reflection upon
them." 40
2. "Knowledge Is True Opinion"
i. The Confusion of Knowledge with Opinion
Theaetetus' second definition was that "knowledge is
true opinion," 4 ^ But false opinion is impossible 1) in the
sphere of knowledge, for things are either known or not
known; 42 and 2) in the sphere of being, because it is im-
possible when seeing or hearing not to see or hear some
35. Theaet., 170C. Cf . Crat., 386D. Thus the implica-
tion of Taylor's statement is realized. Supra, 19 .
36. Theaet., 171B. Cf. Euthyd . , 296 .
37. Theaet., 1713 . It is apparent that epistemology
is to a large extent interdependent on metaphysics. The^
implication of this concession is metaphysical; the Sopnists
held one world of sensible objects; Plato taught the tv.o
realms of objects and Ideas. See supra, 13.
-7 o Theaet.
, 17^A.
70 These arguments would also have been usee oy Plato
against *Kume . See Hume, ECHU, 596-607, for arguments similar
those of Protagoras. See also Kant, - -rV , B5
.
40
.
Taylor, PMW, 339 .
41 . Thea et . , 187B.
42. T5id . , 187E-I88A.
•.
.
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existing thing. 4 ^ To think what is not is not to think, 44
and falsity is not one real object thought to be some other
real object. 4 ^
A way out of this difficulty was suggested by Theaetetus
one may know Socrates, and yet mistake him for another, 4 '^
Socrates then compared memory to a wax tablet; each man has
different qualities of wax/ 7 Thus error arises in con-
fusing the image on the wax with the sensed object. Yet
there are still four cases in which error is impossible:
1 ) between two things not perceived by sense; 2) between two
things when one has a sensible impression of one or both
or neither of them; 3 ) between two things, both of which
are known and perceived, and of which the impression coin-
cides with sense; and 4 ) between two things which both or
one only are known and perceived and have an impression cor-
48
responding to sense.
Socrates concluded that false opinion is the erroneous
40
com Dination of sensation and thought, - and the kinds and
degrees of knowledge individuals possess are due to the
qualities of the wax.^* Yet upon examination, this conclu-
c;
sion must be rejected: error occurs in thought also.
43 . Theaet . , 188D. Cf . Soph . , 240-241. Wild points
out that the denial of this statement has serious conse-
quences: "it may lead us to the erroneous conclusion that
certain sensations are somehow false." PTI.i, 249
.
44 . Theaet . , 1 8£3
.
4^. 1 bid
. ,
10oG. The observation that error does not
exist in sensation or knowledge, but only in opinion, is
important for Plato's theory of knowledge. See below, 3r ~4c.
46. Theaet
.
, 1 <mB.
47. Ibid.
,
191E.
48
.
Ibid
.
192A-E
.
49 . Ibid . I 93 C.
60 . Ibid . 194D.
5 1 • Ibid . I 95D .
..
'
'
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Socrates was arguing .in this analysis for essentially
tue same thing that he argued for previously
;
52
men have
minds whose object is being. The object of opinion is
not being; and unlike sensation, it is "not merely ’had’
as a. feeling. It is ’maintained’ against other possibili-
ties. It is not an experience but a theory." 55 Knowledge
and opinion have different objects, and different faculties
are used to realize these objects. Neither faculty can be
"reduced” to the other.
ii. The Objects of Knowledge
Socrates next analyzed the knowing process. "To know"
is not "to have" but "to possess" knowledge
. To illus-
trate his meaning, Socrates constructed the simile of the
aviary
.
The possession of knowledge involves three stages;
1) the original capture, 2) the detention for use, and
3 ) the second capture for use.
rr
In other words, knowledge
involves 1) acquisition, 2) latent possession, and 3) con-
scious possession and use,^ False opinion therefore re-
sults from catching the wrong bird.
C
^ But how, asked
Socrates, can a man, having knowledge, mistake it for ig-
58
norance? A partial solution was offered by having birds
of ignorance , but this leads to the same difficulty:
c phow can a man take a form of ignorance for knowledge?
52 . Supra, 23. 55 . Ibid.
,
I07E. c 8
.
Ibid
.
,
1 or*C •
53 . Wild, PTH, 251 . 56 . Ibid . lo 0E
.
50
.
Ibid., 200A.
54 . Theaet., I97B. 57 . Ibid . I90B 60 . Ibid., 200C.
..
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The cause of this difficulty is, as Wild writes, that;
Theaetetus makes the mistake of regarding
knowledge as a set of isolated bits which
are simply heaped, together as we come to
know more and more. Hence we can only in-
terpret error as an actual "bit" of igno-
rance.
. .
1
oocrates concluded that they were seeking false opinion
before knowledge; rather, they should seek knowledge before
false opinion.^ 2
iii, Knowledge as Opinion with Knowledge
Lastly, Theaetetus defined knowledge as true opinion
accompanied by a reason.^ In other words, as Socrates
noted, knowledge is of the composite But knowledge is
something over and above the parts. Yet, this definition
implies that the whole differs from the all which, as
Socrates demonstrated, is absurd.
Socrates made a second interpretation of Theaetetus'
definition: knowledge is right opinion wi th rational ex-
planation. Three suggestions were offered to clarify the
word "explanation 1) the reflection of thought is speech
(but this is not peculiar to those who know) \ ^ 2) the
enumeration of the parts of a thing (but there may be enu-
kP
meration of parts without knowledge)
; 3) true opinion
about a thing with the addition of a mark or sign of dif-
6 1 . Wild, PTM, 264
.
probably directed at
62
.
Theaet
.
,
2POD
.
63. Ibid., 20 ID.
An tis there s. See Field,
PHC
,
160.
64 . Ibid., 203BC . The dis-
cussion of the theory of analysis
which this definition involves is
65. Theaet . , 204A.
66 . Tbid . , 204B-r206 .
67 . Ibid., 206E-207A.
6P
.
Ibid., 207A-C.
I
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ference (hut right opinion already involves a knowledge of
difference),"^ Furthermore, this definition means that
knowledge is knowledge of difference; and it is incorrect
70
to include in a definition the word being defined,
3 , Summary of the Argument
Plato offered no constructive theory of knowledge in
the Theaetetus
;
yet the confusion of knowledge with sensa-
tion and opinion in the definitions advanced by Theaetetus,
and Socrates' exposures of this confusion, has brought out
two fundamental principles of Platonic epistemology: i) the
realm of knowledge is separate and distinct from either
sensation or opinion; and 2) the mind is a distinct and
fundamental reality which is not reducible to something
else, and which alone has true knowledge and. being as its
object. An examination of Plato's epistemology demonstrates
the use he made of these two principles.
Theaet., 208P-20O3.
70 . Ibid . , 20 1 A
.
.•
•
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CHAPTER III
2?
PLATO'S THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE
Plato's theory of knowledge is based on the fundamen-
tal distinction between appearance and reality. Pater ob-
served that this distinction, as many other of his important
philosophic doctrines, was not original; rather, it was the
result of the influence of the Eleatics, especially Parmeni-
des, who "became a sort of inspired voice" for Plato. 1
There are fragments from Parmenides' poem, "On Truth,"
which indicate this basic distinction:
Yen have set up for themselves, believing as real
Birth and decay, becoming and ceasing...
But... the uttermost limit of Being is ended and
perfect.
2
In Plato's thought, this metaphysical distinction became an
epistemological division^ in his separation of aoxa and
episteme
.
This theory is best formulated in his "dialectic
ladder .
"
1
.
The Dialectic Ladder
4
To visualize the meaning of his theory, Socrates asked
1. Pater, PAP, 32.
2. In Bakewell, SBAP , 17 .
3. The term "epistemological dualism" used by Yore,
PLA, 108, is avoided because the term has a technical mean-
ing different from the meaning intended here. See Brightman,
I TP
,
78-79, for the technical meaning.
4
.
Rep., 5I0.
•
.
.
.
.
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his listeners to imagine a line which is divided into two
parts. These divisions represent the two spheres of knowl-
edge and opinion. The two segments are again divided into
the two realms of "shadows" and "reflections." The realm of
knowledge is also subdivided into the lower, "understanding,
which "uses the figures given by the former division as
images," but, "instead of going upwards to a principle de-
scends to the other end." And finally, the highest division
"dialectic," is that In which the soul "passes out of hy-
potheses and goes up to a principle which is above hypothe-
ses." These four stages relate to the faculties of percep-
5
tion, faith, understanding, and reason.'
1 ) The lowest step on the ladder is that of mere ap-
pearance, of sensation, or conjecture. It is placed at the
g
bottom because reason is least used in conjecture, and it
consists of tne pure, uninterpreted apprehension of things.
2 ) Tne second step is that of belief (pistis) . The
sensations given in conjecture are the data of belief, out
pistis adds to these simple sensations additional irforma-
7
tion about the objects sensed. Demos writes:
The defining characteristic of pistis and,
along with it, of all opinion as cllstin-
guished from reason, is that the former
does not apprehend forms in their purity,
it does not abstract, and consequently is
vague
.
°
3 ) From opinion Socrates rises to no e s i
s
,
or thought.
g. Rep., 5 1
1
E
. „
.. „
6 . Cf. the story of the den, ibid., 515. iruth^
mr
the prisoners is nothing but tne shadows of images, wnicn
they see, but do not reflect upon.
7 . For a discussion of phantasia , see below, 53.
8
.
Demos, POP, 273.
> ,
..
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The first step in thought is dianoia
,
which is essentially
a change from particulars to universals. Socrates noted
that this is the method of the sciences and mathematics.
Pianola proceeds on the basis of hypotheses, and by deduc-
tion arrives at a conclusion
.
1 °
4) The essential difference between dianoi a and epis -
teme is stated by Socrates; episteme is that sort of
knowledge
which reason herself attains by the power of
dialectic, using the hypotheses not as first
principles, but only as hypotheses--that is
to say, as steps and points of departure into
a world which is above hypotheses, in order
that she may soar beyond them to the first
principle of the whole ... 11
This "first principle" is the Idea of the Good, which is
the philosopher's goal
.
^
The basis of Plato's entire theory of knowledge is
this epistemological division. It remains to examine the
three realms of sensation, opinion, and knowledge.
2 . The Realm of Sensation
Although Plato pictured four stages or steps in his
o. Socrates considered the only true science to be
dialectic, and hence the term as used here has a corrupted
meaning. Cf . Rep
.
, 5 IOE-5 IIA.
10. Ibid., MOD.
1
1
.
Ibid
.
, 5 1
1
G
.
12. Plato said that the story of the den is a repre-
sentation of these four stages, and also the philosopher's
quest up the ladder to an apprehension of the Good. Ibid.,
r
1 yB . However, Robinson holds; l) that conjecture of the
line must mean something different from the prisoners, for
the latter are more than mere vision; and 2 ) conjecture is
not trying to apprehend originals through images, but of
confusing images with originals. See his PHD , 192-213.
Kote that he also questions the interpretation that Plato
did mean the cave and the line to be similar.
.. . .
.
*
*
*
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dialectic ladder, there are only three realms, sensation,
opinion, and knowledge, to analyze. The reason for this is,
as Wild has written, that
since the formal structure of things and
the source of this structure are both ap-
prehended by the same faculty of rational
apprehension..., we have to deal only with
three major faculties, not four; sensa-
tion. .
. ,
the object of which is the seem-
ing thing; opinion..., the object of which
is the changing, material thing; and knowl-
edge..., the object of which.is being, and
its stable formal structure, ^
Sensation, one element of doxa
,
apprehends the given. 14
It is useful only as it serves as a reference for reason:
"God invented and g^ve us sight to the end that we might
behold the courses of our intelligence which are akin to
4 ^ ITthem..." Sensations are necessary, and are natural to
men, "but their reflections on the being and use of them
are slowly and hardly gained, if they are ever gained, by
1
P
education and long experience." -
Sensations as sensations are infallible; if not, one
is faced with the insurmountable difficulties of absolute
phenomenalism. 10 Yet there is more to opinion and knowl-
edge than sensation; mere sensations are a maze of con-
20fusing impressions.
13. Wild, PTM, 242 .
14. For a discussion of the mechanisms of sensation,
see supra, 18-19, especially n. lo . - ote that the proce-
dure is a passive one. Theaet . , 1??C.
15. But even this use is important; "from this source
we derive philosophy." Tim. , 47^*
15. Ibid., 47B.
17. Rep., 506E.
18
.
Theaet
.
,
182^.
lo. See supra, Ip-20. Cf . Soph., 260D.
20 . See Theaet. , l82h.
. . .
/
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3. The Realm of Opinion
Plato's criticisms of phenomenalism and his view of
the realm of sensation reveal the following contrasts
between sensation and opinion: 1) opinion is fallible,
but if it is confused with infallible sensation, it will
be impossible for any opinion to be false, and all men—
2 1
and even animal s--w ill oe unrestrictedly infallible;
2) the object of opinion includes more than the stream
of sensations which proceed in relation to the sense
organs and the object; and 3) opinion differs from sensa-
tion in its independence of any single sense organ.
Opinion for Plato "is the combination of knowledge
and sense, not the simple apprehension of a single object."
Or, more specifically, the realm of opinion is, stated
positively, the
integration of sensible data into
ing objects; described negatively,
the lack of abstract concepts, of
of systematization of belief .-3
endur-
it is
proof.
Opinion is the level t) which has an empirical basis be-
cause it is based on sensation, and 2) on which one has a
conviction that something is true without knowing why it
it is true.' 4 It includes pistls and dianol a, and con-
tains two steps or aspects, phantasia and judgment.
21 . Gf. Tlieaet., 195C. See also supra, 1 P- 1 £.
22 . Wild,
-
Pf^!, 262 /
23. Demos, POP, 274 . ,
24
.
"Why" is an important word in Plato's tnought.
It is answered by the synoptic function of dialectic. See
below, 38-39. Having truth without the reasons for truth
is always inferior to the whole truth in Plato. Gf. ReP • >
506D.
.'
,
.
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1) The terra phantasia was used by Plato to denote
the aspect of doxa which is raainly on the level of pistis.'^
Phantasia consists of interpreting sense-data in terms of
the categories. In the Theaetetu s, Plato lists as cate-
gories being and not-being, likeness and unlikeness, same-
ness and difference, unity and numbers, and goodness and
beauty
.
Phantasia is empirical only because it is based on
sensation. Its value as knowledge is very slight, however,
for it gives little or no aid in the search of the mind
for true being. 27
2 ) Judgment is the second factor of opinion, and is
especially the function of dianoia . Plato held that
28
"judgment arises in us from sensation and memory."' It
consists in the development and comparison of concepts,
and thus is the hypothetical method used in the sciences
and mathematics. Because it is a hypothetical method, it
is subject to error, 20
3) The sciences proceed on the basis of unproven
hypotheses, treating these hypotheses as first principles.
But reasoning by hypothesis is vague reasoning in Plato’s
25 . Soph . , 264B. Plato defined phantasia as "the
combination of sensation and opinion." Tbid., 264C. His
use of "opinion" here undoubtedly referred to pistis
,
however, and not to dianoia .
26 . Theaet.y T85E-I86A. See Tim .
,
37-38A, for a
slightly different listing of these "common notions."
27 . Cf. Phaedo , 79CD. In the third period of Plato's
development, there was an increasing emphasis on the value
of experience. See below, 38.
28. Phil .
,
38C. See ibid., 38-39, for the importance
and role of memory in doxa and episteme .
29. In Plato's view, doxa is the only realm in which
error can occur. Cf. below, 39-40
.
••
/
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philosophy, although he did treat hypotheses in great de-
tail. 30
The dialogue Pa rmenides gives an exposition of one
type of hypothesis-reasoning: one may construct a pattern
of consistent propositions of which the initial premises
are contradictories. 3 ^ These hypotheses are then tested:
32
1) dy attempting to reduce them to absurdity;- 2) by
their conformity to the initial general assumptions; 33 or
3) by comparing the pattern with empirical data.. 34 Yet the
method of scientific hypothesis does not lead to the cer-
7C
tainty for which Plato was searching; - and the sciences
can never become the object of episteme, for they are in
the world of sense, not knowledge, and in time, not eter-
nity
.
36
4 ) Mathematics has a unique position in Plato's epi-
37
stemology. ' Plato spoke highly of mathematics, even call-
3 8ing it a necessary prerequisite for dialectic. 1 Yet he
had little use for mathematicians: he never met a mathe-
matician who could reason.
However, the uniqueness of ma.thema.tics lies in the fact
30. See Demos, POP, 282-289, and Robinson, PED, 07-
191, for expositions of this point, as well as for the
references there.
3 1 . Par . , 1 36 C
.
32. Ibid., 12PA.
33. Ibid., 136A.
34. Ibid., 1363.
3s. Robinson doubts that PI? to ever did hold the com-
plete attainment of absolute knowledge as is often ascrioed
to his methodology. PED, 111 - 112 . Yet Plato was searching
for a surer method than that of the sciences.
36. Phil., 59A. Cf. Lutoslaw ski , OGPL, 466 .
37. For treatments of Plato's theory of mathematics,
see Demos, POP, 285-28©; Robinson, PSD, 158- 162 ; Zeller,
OHGP
,
129-131 5 Wild, PTM, 19
©-2CC.
38. Rep . , 826 A.
39. Told., 93 IE.
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that it takes a middle position between the world of sense
40
and reality. The empirical figures of mathematics be-
long to the world of sense; yet the forms of the figures
are like the Ideas in being fixed and eternal. Therefore,
Plato held that in theoretical mathematics, men dream of
4
1
being although they have not yet seen it.
The realm of opinion may now be characterized as the
realm: i) which has its object in the sensible, contingent
world, as opposed to the realm of Ideas; 2 ) in which one
proceeds hypothetically, and is therefore liable to error;
and 3 ) which contains science and mathematics, although
mathematics is unique in that it lies between the world of
sense and reality.
4. The Realm of Knowledge
Opinion, said Plato, is knowledge of the sensible
world
.
42 Had he been contented to stop here, he undoubted-
ly would not have quarreled with the Sophists in the
Theaetetus But Plato did not stop here: there is another
world of unchanging, eternal Ideas which is the goal of
philosophy and the realm of truth.
i. The Development of Plato’s Theory of Lp is seme
The discussions of the realms of sensation and opinion
have been made without regard to the growth and development
40. Mathematics in Plato's time was essentially geom-
etry.
41. Rep. VII, 533 C. For the distinction between the-
oretical and applied mathematics, see ibid., VII, 525^*
42. Ibid., VI, 509E.
..
.
.
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of Plato's thought. Yet in a survey of the realm of knowl-
edge, it is necessary to consider the developmental aspect
of his philosophy in order to comprehend its epistemological
doctrine fully. 4 )
Following Lutoslawski ' s classification 44 of the dia-
logues, there are three general periods in Plato's develop-
ment: i) the early period, 2) the middle or critical peri-
od, ^>nd 3) later Platonism. ’.Vi thin these periods, Plato’s
episteme took three forms*. 1) the psychological or a priori ,
2) the intuitive, and 3) the synoptic.
1) The Ileno , a dialogue of the first period, taught a
type of psychological, a priori knowledge. Plato had not
reached the sharp distinction between opinion and knowl-
edge of his later periods; "he who has true opinion about
that which the other knows . . .will be just as good a guide
if he thinks the truth, as he who knows the truth, "*5 Again,
"then right opinion it )t less useful than knowledge," 0
Pevertheless, Socrates was careful to make a delineation
between opinion and knowledge ir spite of these statements.
The psychological knowledge of Plato's early period
was based, on two premises; 1) the theory of reminiscence,
and 2) the axiom of the unity of the world. 1 True opinion
43. An important problem for the complete understanding
of Plato's philosophy, his theory of logic, is omitted from
this discussion because it belongs to a separate study. For
a complete analysis of Plato's logic, see Lutoslawski, OGPL.
44
.
See ibid., 162 - 183 .
45. Meno, 97B.
46
.
TuTcT.
,
97C.
47. Ibid., 81A-86E.
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is distinguished from knowledge as a different power, prr-
allel to the distinction between appearance and reality;
for a lean's soul had knowledge of being before it was
united with the body. Lutoslawski concludes;
the fact of a priori knowledge proclaimed by
Plato in the Heno w**s for him a psychological
fact, the difference between the state of
mind of one who knows and knows reasons of •
his knowledge, end that of one who believes, . 0
and does not c i re to find out why he believes.
2 ) In the Sy mposium and the Phaedo , Plato turned to-
ward an intuitive type of knowledge. He recommended his.
readers to acquire * superior faculty of intellectual wis-
AC.
dom by exercise in generalization. " His theory of recol-
lection in the Phaedo can. lead to only one observation;
the logical consequence of this doctrine was
the power of reason to acquire all truth ac-
cessible to mankind by pure intuition, by
contemplative meditation without or almost
without external experience. 1^
It is in the Republic
,
however, tha t intuition is most
important. The knowledge gained by intuition is infallible;'
and is no longer as in the Phaedo based upon an ultimate
c 2hypothesis, out upoi a principle which is above all doubt.*
The Knowledge of this principle is r.ot an inference, but an
intuition; and Plato often used metaphorical expressions
48. Lutoslawski, OGPL, 21f. Of. Gomperz, GT , III, 6 .
Demos concludes that Plato’s entire theory of knowledge is
summarized in the affirmation of a priori knowledge; he
compares Plato's method to Descartes' Universal Mathematics
and Spinoza’s Ethics more eometrico demon strata . POP, 294-
297. This interpretation, however, does r.ot take account
of the development in Plato's thought.
49. 5ymp . , 2 tOA. See Gomperz, GT , III, 391 , for a
statement of the mysticism in this dialogue.
50. Lutoslawski, OGPL, 288* See Phaedo, 83A.
51. Hep. V, 477^.
52 . Told., VI, 51 OB.
s 1
',
•
•
•
-
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•
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taken from the senses of sight and touch to denote the im-
mediate character of this knowledge.
3) In the reconstruction period of Plato’s thought,
knowledge ceases to be pure intuition, and becomes the prod-
uct of thought as a co-ordinating agency, with analysis and
synthesis as the two powerful means of inquiry.^ 4 The Ideas
remain the realm of being and the objects of knowledge, but
they have lost their objective, transcendental existence; C
and the mind has become, along with movement, the explana-
tion of everything. There is also an increasing recogni-
c?
tion of the value of experience, and the Idea of the Good
c pis to be found in being, beauty, and truth.- Chroust sum-
marized this period in Plato’s development thus:
The knowledge of ideas consists of rational
judgments organized into a coherent body.
It is based upon the experience of value and
worth, rational intuition, and the apprehen-
sion of self-evident propositions and their
rationally cogent implica tior s .
—
ii. The Characteristics of Epis teme
The relation between knowledge and opinion in Plato
resulted from the observation that:
That which is apprehended by intelligence and
reason is always in the same state, but that
g3. Cf. Rep. VI, 5 1 1 AB ; VI, fl8C; and VI, 533BE.
§ 4 . See Soph., 249A-250D, and Phil., 28E-31D.
5c. Lutoslawski writes*. "The old conception of substan-
tial ideas is criticised in the Parmenides in a manner that
may suggest a doubt whether it had ever oeen maintained by
Plato in the crude form admitted by his interpreters." OC-PL,
522 -523 .
"56 *. Cf. Soph., 248 C-250E, and Laws X, 823B-805S.
57 . Soph., 234 P, and Laws VI, 769D; 888A.
58. Phil . , 20E.
59. dhroust, Art. (1947), 414 .
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which is conceived by opinion with the help
of sensation and without reason, is always
in a process of oecoming and perishing and
never really is.-^
Although Plato's view of the realm of knowledge under-
went these changes, there are nevertheless certain charac-
teristics of epis teme which are relatively stable. The
distinguishing feature of epis teme is that it substitutes
the synoptic view for the analysis of the sciences. Its
method is dialectic, and it is demonstrative and abstract
knowledge
.
Dialectic destroys hypotheses, but this destruction is
not all derogatory: dialectic uses hypotheses as "points of
departure" in approaching truth.^ 1 Dialectic is the method
of the philosopher: it is a process of accepting and reject
hypotheses until the most synoptic view is found.^ It
reaches the realm of truth because it attains true being.
Therefore, there can be no error in episteme (as tnere is
no error in sensation): a man cannot mistake knowledge for
ignorance ,^3 Error is possible only in the realm of opinion
5 . The Final Rejection of Phenomenalism
Plato's analysis of homo men sura omnium and his theory
of knowledge reveal five refutations of the Protagorean
Phenomenalism;
1) Sensation and knowledge in Plato's thought are
60. Tim., 2PA.
61
.
CTT Rep . VII, 533D. Hence, dialectic is the
"coping-stone of the sciences." Ibid., VII, 534-*
62. Par., 13SE.
63. CF7 supra, 23-24.
• •
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infallible; only opinion errs. The attempt to reduce knowl-
edge to sensation leads to irreconcilable difficulties; and
knowledge cannot be opinion, for knowledge is not knowledge
if It errs.
2 ) The theory that "all is motion" makes knowledge
impossible. The realm of Ideas constitutes the eternal,
immutable sphere which is not "becoming," but "being."
3) The objects of knowledge are not in the contingent,
sensible world, but are the abstract, demonstrative Ideas
in the realm of true being.
4 ) Truth and Good are not functions of each situation
and each personal! ty . There is an eternal Truth and an
absolute Good which are true and good for all men at all
times
.
c
) The mind in Protagoras' thought became a non-
existent entity. Yet the mind is the only immediate reality
known to men. In Plato's philosophy, the mind, though not
in itself the highest value, 04 is the only faculty by which
one can attain an apprehension of the Idea of the Good.
Thus Plato has defined both the method and the object
65
of the philosopher. He is a lover of truth ard being,
and these, his constant objectives, must always oe before
him. His is the task of being "the spectator of all time
and all existence
.
64
.
Cf. Phil., 22b.
65. Rep. V,” 47PC
•
66. Ibid., VI, 4P6 A.
-
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CHAPTER IV
ARISTOTLE' S INTERPRETATION OF
HONO MENSURA OIJNIUI*
Aristotle's interpretation of Protagoras' saying,
homo aensura omnium
,
followed essentially Plato's analy-
sis of the dictum. He did not make an original attempt
to understand the spying, or to reexamine the premises on
which Plato presumed the theory to rest. To comprehend
fully Aristotle's criticisms of Protagoras' thesis, it is
therefore necessary 1) to recognize the influence of Plato's
interpretation of the homo mensur a formula on Aristotle,
and 2 ) to determine the exact formulation of the problem
of phenomenalism which Aristotle made.
1. The Influence of Plato's Interpretation
Plato identified the Protagorean saying with two the-
ories; i) that knowledge is sensible perception, and 2 ) that
reality is a "flux." He maintained that Protagoras taught
the doctrine that every man's opinion is true to himself,
and that there is no criterion against which to attest the
truth of opinions. Furthermore, Plato considered homo aen -
sura to rest on the Keraclitean "flux;"^ all things are
1. As he interpreted the theory. He was in error in
this analysis, however.- See supra, 1*5-16.
*••
.
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in a state of motion, and there is nothing stable or at
rest in the universe. " Mind and ooject become non-existent;
they come together only to generate sensations, and have no
separate or independent existence.^ Knowledge thus becomes
impossible.
In his own refutation of Protagoras' dictum, Aristotle,
as Jowett observed, "is only following Plato." 4 He accept-
ed the two premises which Plato held were the basis of the
Protagorean theory, namely, that knowledge is perception,
and that reality is a complete and constant "flux." Thus
it is the "Platonic Protagoras" which Aristotle criticized;
and it is therefore not necessary to examine separately
Aristotle’s interpretation of the saying.
It should be noted again, however, that neither Plato
nor Aristotle interpreted homo mer.sura accurately or ade-
quately. Grote has written.;
I have endeavored to show that the capital
tenet of Protagoras is essentially distinct
from the other tenets with which these two
philosophers would identify it; distinct
both from the doctrine of Herakleitus, That
everything is in unceasing flux and process,
each particular moment thereof being an im-
plication of contradictories both alike true;
and distinct also from the other dogma held
by others, That all cognition is sensible
perception... His tenet is nothing more than
a clear and general declaration of the prin-
ciple of universal Relativity.-
2 . Supra , 20 .
3 . Supra , 22
.
4. Jowett (tr. and ed
.
) , DP , IV, 259.
5 . Grote, ARI , 431
.
.
.
.
'
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2. Aristotle’s Formulation of the Problem
Aristotle maintained that the source of error in Hera-
clitus’ and Protagoras’ theories was that they denied the
Law of Contradiction; therefore, they dismissed the pos-
sibility of definition, for all attributes become only acci-
7dental. Both theories "proceed from the same way of think-
8ing;" if all opinions and appearances are true, all state-
ments must be true and false at the same time; and all opin-
ions must be true because "right" and "wrong" can be deter-
mined only in the realm of opinion.^
5
The fundamental prob-
lem is metaphysical: if reality is as defined by Heraclitus
then Protagoras is right.
The cause of this difficulty, Aristotle held, is two-
fold. First, these thinkers have assumed that contraries
or contradictories are true at the same time because they
observe contraries coming into existence out of the same
thing. 11 This statement is directed especially against
Anaxagoras and Democritus, who taught that "all is mixed in
all." 1c? Anaxagoras thought that "a thing is mixed with or
separated from already existing things." 1 ^ Democritus held
this view by insisting that the void and the full exist alik
in everything, thus affirming the existence of being and not
6. An analysis of this law is found below’, 48-4P
.
7. Meta. IV, 4, 1C0? a 2°“31
.
8. Ibid., IV, g, 1009a 18.
9. Ibid., IV, 5, 1PC9a 6- 12
.
10. Aristotle’s interpretation of Heraclitus is essen-
tially the same as Plato’s. See supra, 21-22.
11. Meta. IV, 5, 1000a 24-26.
12. Ibid. , IV, 5, 1009a 28.
13. Fragment 17, in Bakewell, SBAP , 50.
••
'
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being at the same time, 1A
The second cause of this difficulty is that some think-
ers have inferred the truth of appearances from the observa-
tion of the sensible world. This had three results;
1) knowledge thus consists only of sensations; 2) "that
which is" is identical with the sensible world ; ^ and 3) be-
cause the world of nature appears to be one of constant
change, and about the constantly changing nothing true can
1 8be held, nothing can De truly affirmed.
Thus Aristotle's analysis of phenomenalism started from
essentially the same premises that Plato assumed. His prob-
lem was therefore to refute these suppositions, namely, that
knowledge is sensation, and that reality is a complete "flux;"
and to establish the validity of his own thought as part of
his refutation of phenomenalism.
14 . Fragment 0 , in Bakewell,
15 . Meta. IV, g
T5id.
,
IV,
,
1000b 1-2.
16. c, 1 069b 1^.
17 . Ibid., IV, 1010a 1-3.
18. Ibid., IV, 5 , 1010a 6-9
.
SBAP, 6C .
..
.
.
.
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CHAPTER V
ARISTOTLE'S REJECTION OF PHENOMENALISM
To comprehend the force of Aristotle's arguments a-
gainst Protagoras' homo men aura formula, it is necessary
to understand first the Laws of Contradiction and Excluded
Middle. Indeed, Aristotle's thought turned to the philos-
ophies of Heraclitus, Anaxagoras, and Protagoras because
their systems, he held, denied these laws. 1 Therefore,
Aristotle's refutation of homo men sura consists of two
Parts; i) establishing the validity of these laws, and
2) an explicit statement of the manner in which the thought
p
of Anaxagoras, Heraclitus, and Protagoras violates the laws.
1
.
The Laws of Contradiction and Excluded Middle
The philosopher, Aristotle held, is he who studies being
qua being and, therefore, it is the function of the philos-
opher to be able to investigate all things. 4 Important among
these things are the principles of science, mathematics, and
logic but of greatest importance is the most certain prin-
1. Meta . IV, 4, 1005b 35.
2. Because Aristotle considered Protagoras' thesis to
rest on the philosophies of Anaxagoras axel Heraclitus, this
refutation of phenomenalism necessarily involves a critique
of these two thinkers. See supra, 43. It must be emphasized
again, however, that this study has presented the thought of
Anaxagoras and Heraclitus as Aristotle interpreted it, not
as modern research views the thought of these men.
3. Meta. IV, 2, 1003b 18- 19.
4
.
iDid
•
,
IV, 2 , 1004b 1 .
5. Ibid., IV, 3, lOOga 19, 30; 1005b 6.
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ciple of all, the Law of Contradiction,^ The study of this
principle does not belong to the special sciences because
the scientist assumes the validity of the law when he comes
7to his science,' Yet the philosopher, whose task is the
interpretation of all things, is faced with the problem of
this principle.
The Law of Contradiction is: "that the same attribute
cannot at the same time belong and not belong to the same
p
subject and in the same respect."' This is stated objective-
ly as a law of being, but from it follows a psychological
law:
to think that the same attribute does and does
not belong to the same thing at the same time
in the same respect would be to be oneself op-
positely qualified at the same time in the same
respect, and is therefore impossible.
The Law of Contradiction together with the Law of Ex-
cluded Middle^ are the first principles of demonstration.
Yet these laws do not themselves need to oe demonstrated;
those who demand its demonstration do so "through want of
education, for not to know of what things one should demand
demonstration, and of what one should not, argues want of
educa tion ,
"
1
1
Ravaisson writes:
Le principe d’une demonstration est done une
proposition qui no peut etre prouvke et cpii
n'a pas besoin de l'etre, c
'
est-li-dire ou le
6. Meta
.
IV, 3, 1005b 1?.
7. Ibid., IV, 3, lOC^b 18. Cf . An . Po st . I, 11, 77a 10.
8. Meta. IV, 3, 1005b 19-20. By a "subject," Aristotle
meant substance. For a discussion of the meaning of substance
and essence, see below’, 62-69.
9. From Ross, ARI , 1 c 9 . See Meta. IV, 3, 25 *31 .
10 . For a discussion of Excluded Mi ddl e , see below, 48 .
11. Meta. IV, 4 , 1006a c -6. See also An. Post . I, 2,
7 H> 25-72 a 24 .
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rapport du pr&dicat au sujet est Evident de
soi-meme
.
1
Nevertheless, Aristotle did offer many arguments and
ooservations in support of the Law of Contradiction. First,
to demand demonstration of this principle is to ask for an
infinite regress of demonstrations.^ Yet such a regress
is unnecessary, for there cannot he a principle more self-
evident than tnis law even though positive proof is impos-
sible.
In spite of this lack of positive proof, however, Ari-
stotle maintained that the law could De demonstrated nega-
tively. For example, Aristotle assumed that a name has a
meaning: "it is impossiole, then, that 'being a man' snould
mean precisely 'not being a man,' if 'man' not only signi-
fies something about one subject but also about one signif-
1
4
icance ..."
Secondly, the denial of this law eliminates the possi-
bility of definition because substance and essence have
been done away with.^ Yet if all statements are accidental,
taere can be no subject about which the statements are made.
An infinite regress of accidents is impossiole, however, be-
cause an accident is not an accident of accident, but an
accident of subject.^"7
A third negative argument in support of the law con-
cerns negations: one must predicate of every subject the
12. Ravaisson
,
EliA, I, 365.
13. Leta
.
IV, 4, 1P06a o.
14. Ibid , iv, 4, 1006b 14-16.
15. I bid , IV, 4, 1007a 25-31
.
16. Ibid. , IV, 4, 1007a 34- 1007b 1.
17. Ibid. , IV, 4, 1007b 10-16.
..
.
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affirmation or negation of every attribute. But, "it is
absurd if of each subject its own negation is to be pred-
icable, while the negation of something else which cannot be
i °predicated of it is not to be predicable of it."' Thus,
although lacking demonstration of the Law of Contradiction,
Aristotle held that it w=s an immediately known, indubitable
truth which is necessary for all knowledge. 10
The Law of Excluded middle is the second principium of
thought which Aristotle held to be ultimate even though it
is not capable of being proved by demonstration. It reads:
"there cannot be an intermediate between contradictories,
but of one subject we must either affirm or deny any one pred-
icate."^ That is, between two contradictories, one must be
false.^ Yet because the Law of Excluded Middle is a sup-
plement or correlative of the Law of Contradiction, a sep-
arate discussion of this law is unnecessary.
Thus Aristotle formulated the prir cipia which he used
to attack the theories of Anaxagoras, Heraclitus, and Pro-
tagoras. He charged these thinkers with violation of the
implications of these maxims.
2. Refutation of Anaxagoras and Heraclitus
The theory of Anaxagoras which Aristotle attacked is
that in the beginning all things were together. J Thereby,
18. Meta . IV, 4, 100?t> 30 -32 .
19. Ravaisson's observation here is important: "Les
axiomes ne sont pas la source des demonstrations: mais ils
en sont la regie et la condition." EMA, I, 375.
20
.
Meta. IV, 7 , 1011 b 24.
21
.
Told., IV, P, 1012b 12 .
22. See Grote, ARI, 426.
23. See Fragment 1, in Bakewell, SBAP, 49 .
..
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Anaxagoras denied all simple bodies and all definable at-
tributes except I'-ous. 4 The Law of Excluded Middle is, as
G-rote observed, ’’maintained by Aristotle as a doctrine in
pc
opposition to this theory of Anaxagoras."
Aristotle made two specific criticisms of this theory.
First, the followers of Anaxagoras seemed to be speaking of
the indeterminate, and, "while fancying themselves to be
speaking of being, they ^re speaking about non-being; for it
is that which exists potentially and not in complete reality
that is indeterminate."^ Thus, Aristotle held, Anaxagoras
failed to make the distinction between potentiality and
07
a ctuali ty ,‘ : which led him to deny the Law of Excluded Mid-
dle.
The second criticism is based on Aristotle’s observa-
tion that according to Anaxagoras' view, "modifications and
accidents could be separated from substances." If this
is true, then there is an intermediate term between contra-
dictories. This criticism is made even more directly against
Anaxagoras' theory that "all things are in everything." ^
If this is true, contradictories can be predicated of the
same subject,^0 for "everything" includes contradictories.
The Law of Contradiction, as Grote again observed, "is
intended by Aristotle to controvert Herakleitus, and to up-
24. This interpretation of Anaxagoras is Aristotle's.
For a statement of Anaxagoras' view, see Fragment 12 , in
Bakewell, SBAP, 49 .
25. Grote, ARI , ^80.
26. Meta . IV, 4 , 1CP7^ 26-29.
27. 7or Aristotle's definition and use of these terms,
see below, 56 , especially n. 9 .
28. Meta
.
I, 8, 989b 2 .
2Q. See Fragment 6, in Bakewell, SBAP, 5c.
36 . Meta . XI, 6 , 1063b 2^.
..
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hold durable substances v/ith definable attributes." Ke
interpreted Heraclitus' theory as meaning "that all sensible
things are ever in a state of flux and there is no knowledge
about them."
Aristotle's criticisms of Heraclitus' "flux" revolved
arour.d the possibility of knowledge; he considered knowl-
edge impos stole under the Keraclitean theory. His first
argument was that if what was said by him is true, not even
txie statement itself will be true; i. e.
,
that the same
thing can both be and not be at the same time. For, when
two statements are separated, the affirmation will be no
more true than the negation. "The whole t-^ken as an affir-
mation will be no more true than the negation
.
"^"5
This argument foreshadows the second:
The supporters of the ideal theory were led to
it because on the question about the truth of
things they accepted the Heraclitean sayings
which describe all sensible things as ever
passing away, so that if knowledge or thought
is to have an object, there must be some other
and permanent entities, apart from those which
are sensible; for there could be no knowledge
of things which were ir a state of flux,^ 4
Yet men do have knowledge, and, therefore, there must be
something in the universe which is not in a state of "flux"
Aristotle's critique of the thought of Anaxagoras and
Heraclitus emphasizes an important fact: their theories
did not follow the prlncipia of thought which are necessary
for knowledge. Reality as defined by these two thinkers
31 . Grote, ARI , 579.
32. I"eta. . I, 6, 977 a 34-35 . Cf. Plato's interpreta-
tion, supra, 2C
.
33. Meta . IX, 5, 1062a 35- 1062b 6. I. e., there must
be principles of both motion and rest if tnere is to be
knowledge. See below, 62; 6f
.
34. Meta. XIII, 4, 1072b 12-17.
'
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does not admit the laws of thought. To he sure,
that region of the sensible world which im-
mediately surrounds us is always in a process
of destruction and generation; hut this is--
so to speak--not even a fraction of the whole,
so that it would have been juster to acquit
this part of the world because of the other-
part, than to condemn the other because of
this .35
To formulate a theory of reality in which reality itself
violates the Laws of Contradiction and Excluded Middle makes
knowledge impossible and the universe a chaos.'
3. Refutation of Homo llensura Omnium
The thesis of Protagoras was the third violator of the
prlncipl a of thought to v/hich Aristotle turned. He identi-
fied the saying, as did Pip to,^ with the viev; that knowl-
edge is sensible perception .^ But this theory controverts
the Law of Contradiction, Aristotle held, and therefore he
was led to criticize the dictum.
Regarding the nature of truth, Aristotle maintained
that not everything which appears is true; i. e., that there
is a difference between sensation qua sensation, and the
uses to which sensation may be put. Protagoras, Aristotle
argued, failed; i) to make the distinction between thinking
and sensation; and 2) to recognize the difference between
er. tia and percepta
.
35 . Meta . IV, 5, 1010a 29 “33 .
36. Cf. "to seek truth would be to follow game." Ibid.,
IV, 5, 1 C09 a 37 . Also, "all attributes belong already to
all subjects." Ibid., IV, 5, 1C 10a 37.
37. Supra, 18 .
38. Meta . IV, 5, ICOpb 13.
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i. The cor fusion of sensation and knowledge
Sensation qua sensation is infallible when the senses
perceive ar "appropriate object," e. g., when the eyes see
color. To deny the infallibility of sensation leads to
con tradic ti ons
:
For it is possible that the same thing may
appear to be honey to the sight, but not to
the taste, and that, since we have two eyes,
things may not appear the same to each, if
their sight is uni ike. 4C
Furthermore, the senses obey the Law of Contradiction: "each
of which senses never says at the same time of the same ob-
ject that it simultaneously is 'so and not so'." 4 ^
The difficulty in Protagoras' view is that it can give
no reasonable account of error/'- If knowledge consists of
sensible perceptions alone, then "the same attribute does
and does not belong to the same thing at the same time in
the same respect." Thus the Law of Contradiction would, be
denied if Protagoras' dictum is true. But the senses do not
disagree about a quality as they must if every man is to be
right in his own opinion
;
4 ^ rather, they disagree "about
that to which the quality belongs." 44 That is, although the
senses do not violate the Law of Contradiction qua senses
(i. e., sensing), the object to which the senses can, if
39. Meta . IV, 5, 1010a 16. The mechanisms of sensation
in Aristotle's psychology are given below, 70-72.
40
.
Meta
.
IV, 6 , 1011a 25-29.
41. Ibid., IV, 5, 1010b 18.
42. Cf. Plato's view, supra, 24-26.
43. Meta, IV, 5, 1010b 2s. The alternative to this
view, Aristotle recognized, would be the affirmatior of com-
plete relativism (ibid., IV, 6» 1011b 4). Perhaps if he had
followed this line of thought, he might have interpreted Pro-
tagoras more accurately 'see supra, 12). Aristotle could not
admit a theory of relativism, however. See below7
,
74.
44. Meta. IV, 5, l^lOb 21.
..
.
.
.
.
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there is no discerning principle, be considered to have and
not to h»ve the same attribute at the same time. The reason
for this is, as Plato held, 4r that the mind does not have a
separate existence in the theory of Protagoras, but comes
together witn the object only to generate sensations. Thus,
Aristotle concluded, error cannot occur in sensation, but
only in tne combinations of sensations. 4
ii
. The confusion of percepta and ertia
The second difficulty in Protagoras' dictum is that in
the investigation of the truth respecting er tia
,
he supposed
that en ti a were only percep ta :
I’ow the viev; that neither the sensible qual-
ities r.or the sensations would exist is doubt-
less true (for they are affections of the per-
ceiver)
,
but th°t the substrata which cause
the sensation should not exist even apart from
sensation is impossible. For sensation is
surely not the sensation of itself, but there
is something beyond the sensation, which must
be prior to the sensation; for that which moves
in nature is prior to that which is moved, and
if they are correlative terms, this is no less
the cafie,^
Aristotle saw that there is plausibility in Protagoras'
thought because there is in nature much of the indeterminate
or potential. Yet the view does not contain the whole
truth: it is not the same to change in quality and quantity,
and granting that "in quantity a thing is not constant, still
it is ir respect of its form that we know each thing." 40 But
45 . Supra , 21 - 22 .
46. 1 'eta
.
IV, r ) 1010b 2 . This statement
fully below
, 74 -75 #
47. Meta IV, 1010b 32 - 3°.
43. Ibid
.
,
IV, 1010a 3 ; cf. lOOOa 32 .
49. Ibid . IV, 5> 1010a 24 -25.
*.
'
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to deny the real nature of er. tia is an untenable position,
"for that which is losing a quality has something of that
which is "being lost, and of that which is coming to "be,
something must already be."^ Therefore, Aristotle conclud-
ed, there is more to en tia than percepta
4 . Summary of the Argument
Aristotle rejected the views of Heraclitus and Anax-
agoras "which proceed from trie sensible world" r ' because they
spoke only of the indeterminate or potential. Reality there-
fore would be chaotic because the pr in cipie of thought are
not valid; and knowledge of such a reality is also impossible.
Hence, Aristotle rejected Protagoras' dictum because; t ' it
denied the infallibility of sensation, which leads to irrec-
oncilable contradictions; and 2 ) it confused en.tla and per -
cepta
,
thereby denying the true nature of er. tia
.
Aristotle's problems were, therefore, to demonstrate
that there is more to nature than the changing sensible world;
that all things are not all in motion or all at rest, thus
showing that reality does rot violate the prir cipia of demon-
stration and racking knov/ledge poseiole; and to prove the
existence of an unmoved mover which moves everything that is
m motion
.
“
g.O. Meta
.
IV, r, irioa 17 - 18 .
5
1
.
See supra, 43-44.
<52. These problems were formulated by Aristotle in
Meta
.
IV, 8 , 1012b 22-31 .
..
.
.
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CHAPTER VI
ARISTOTLE'S REPLY TO PKELOKELALISM
There are three major parts of Aristotle's works which
must he considered as elements in his rejection of the homo
mensura formula. First, in direct opposition to the thesis
of Heraclitus, upon which he considered Protagoras' dictum
to rest, he formulated a rational definition of motion.
For the understanding of his rejection of phenomenalism, a
survey of his concept of motion is therefore necessary.
Secondly, it is necessary to consider Aristotle's view of
the object of knowledge, for Keracli tus--a.s he understood
him--denied the possibility of an "object of knowledge."
Lastly, because Protagoras believed that the objects of
knowledge could not be apprehended by men, it is necessary
to review Aristotle's concept of sensation and its relation
to the knowing process.
1. Aristotle's Concept of .'.lotion
Two factors are important for the consideration of
Aristotle's concept of motion; t) be considered nature to
be a principle of movement,
1
and 2) he held that he was the
first philosopher to deal expressly with movement."5
1 . Phys . I , 2, 185a 13 .
2 . "eta. I, 4 , 985b 17-19.
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The Eleatics had denied the existence of movement al-
together.^ The mechanists, Anaxagoras, Empedocles, and the
4Atomists, ' had denied the existence of change of quality;
there is only a "coming together" and a "separating out." r
The I.legaric school, while admitting the existence of move-
£
ment, had divided it into indivisible unitary movements. '1
Aristotle, however, rejected the thoughts of these schools •
*7
ana argued for the existence of continuous movement.
i. Change, activity, and locomotion
p
Aristotle defined change as "the fulfilment of what
exists potentially, in so far as it exists potentially."'
The difference between movement and activity is, as Ross has
noted, that
in each moment of activity, potentiality is
completely cancelled and transformed into
actuality; in movement the transformation
is not complete till the movement is over.
In other words, movement differs from activ-
3. Meta. I, 4 , 984b 1-8.
4
.
There is serious doubt whether either Anaxagoras or
Empedocles was a mechanist; however, Aristotle considered
them to be so
.
5. De Gen, et Corr . I, 8, 32 5 a 23 ~24 .
6. Fhys .~VT, 1 , 232a 6 - 10 ; 24
9
a 28-68. Cf . Plato,
Per
.
,
i 56PE*
7. "Continuous" is defined by Aristotle p state
"when the touching limits of each of two things become one
and the same °nd are, ^s the word implies, contained in each
other." Phy
s
.
V, 3, 22?a 11 - 12 .
8. I. e., any change or development. Ever logical im-
plication (movement of thought) is included in this defini-
tion .
p. Phys. Ill, 1, 20ia 10 - 11 . Aristotle recognized the
difficulty in defining "potentiality" and "actuality" ( Pet
a
.
VII, ig, 1040a 5-8); he could only indicate its nature Ey
pointing to particular instances. Thus a statue exists po-
tentially In a block of marble, and the completed statue is
actuality. Cf. Phys
.
Ill, 6, 206 & 18 - 20 .
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ity as the incomplete from the complete; or,
more loosely
,
movement is incomplete activ-
ity and activity is completed movement,
^
Thus movement is a process of actualization, out one which
precludes the continued presence of the potential . ^ ' Activ-
ity, on the other hand, is completed movement, and ^Iso in-
cludes the use of what is complete, e. g., the use of a
1 Obrick qgp brick.
'
Change "is f rom something t_o some thing , " ‘ 2 and occurs
in ?>11 the categories. Fundamentally, there are tv o types
of change: i) aosolute change, such as takes place in gen-
eration and destruction, and 2) local change, such as in-
crease or decrease and locomotion. Change which is not ac-
cidertal is between contraries, ' of which there are four
possibilities; i) from subject to subject; 2) from subject
to non-subject (or "perishing"); 3) from non-subject to sub-
ject (or "becoming"); and 4) from non-subject to non-subject, ®
Absolute change occurs in the category of Substance, which
can undergo generation and destruction. Local charge occurs
1
7
in the categories of Quality, Quantity, and Place, 1 The
in. Ross, ARI, 82
.
11. Rhys. Ill, 1, 2Clb 7-15. The sources of change are,
therefore, form, matter, and privation, all three of which
must be present in any instance of genuine change. These
principles are discussed below, 63-65.
12 . This distinction of the use of an actualized object
involves the distinction between the first and second actuality.
E. g., the first actualization of clay is a brick, while the
actualization of a brick would be a house.
13 . Rhys. V, 1 , 224b 35. Thus Aristotle considered
change to be the inclusive term, wuile activity and locomotion
are types of change.
14
.
Accidental change is not discussed by Aristotle be-
cause it is only accidental. ?hy
s
.
V, 1, 224b 27.
15. Absolute change also occurs between contradictories.
See below
,
58.
16 . Rhys . V, 1 , 225?. 13 - 19 .
17. TtT”must be noted that change occurs In all the
*•
'
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fundamental distinction between absolute and local change is
that the latter can occur only between contra ries, while a,b-
i p
solute change occurs between contradictories.
Change in respect of Place is termed locomotion, ^ It
is the only type of chorine which is continuous, for it exists
in space, and space is continuous. Locomotion itself, however,
is complex, for there are three types of spatial movement:
1) movement in a straight line; 2) movement in a circle; and
3) movement from a combination of these two. 2f> Movement in a
circle is the most perfect type of movement; yet it is not
its own efficient c°use.^1 Locomotion is thus the most gener-
pp
al and primary change involving charge of Place."'
ii. Place
Aristotle's concept of locomotion implies that Place is
something; and that it is not dependent on the object con-
tained therein. ' Place is defined as "the boundary of the
containing body at which it is in contact with the contained
body. "24 Parenthetically, Aristotle added, "By a contained
body is meant what can be moved by way of locomotion."
categories. This list of the types of change is not meant
to be complete, but rather to present examples of the way in
which Aristotle's tneory of change applies to the categories.
See also below, n.,19*
19. Phys
.
V, t, 225b 1-2.
19. Ibid., V, 2, 226a 25“35. This study is limited to
change in the category of Place because of the clarity with
which the argument moves from the concept of locomotion to
the postulation of an unmoved mover. For a complete analysis
of change in all the categories, see Wild, SF, 37-53.
20. De O a elo IV, 2 - 3 .
21. The prime niover is ultimately responsible for all
movement. See below, 61 .
22. Phys. IV, 3, 208a 31-32.
23. 1 bid. , IV, 3, 208b 27-36.
24. Ibid., IV, 4, 212a 5-7. I’ote that this boundary is
motionless. Ibid., IV, 4, 212a 20.
'...
.
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The characteristics of Place are: i) it contains that
of which it is the place; 2) it is no part of the thing;
3) the immediate pl^ce of a thing is neither less nor great-
er than the thing; and 4) it is separable, and can be left
beamd,*
iii. Void
The concept of Void, Aristotle observed, was used by
his forefunners for four purposes: i) to explain motion,
2) to explain contraction, 3) to explain ir crease, and 4) to
explain the means by wnich the heavens "inhale" (Pythagor-
eans)
,
They considered the void to be Place with nothing
Aristotle argued against these arguments in favor of
the non-existence of Void because: 1) the full can suffer
qualitative change, ard locomotion can occur when one body
makes room for another; 2) things can cor tract by squeezing
out what is contained in them; and 3) a body is increased
pQ
by the addition of body. Void, therefore, does rot exist
potentially or actually, "unless one is willing to call the
condition of movement void. "2°
25. Phys . IV, 4, 2 1 la 1-5. The metaphysical status of
Pla.ce thus explains movement "up and down," for every object
has its own special Place to which it erdeavors to return.
26. Ibid., IV, 6» 213b 3-29. The explanation of motion,
contraction, and increase by means of the void was made ex-
pressly by Democritus. See Ueberweg, HOP, I, 69; also, Phy s .
IV, 6/
27. IV, 7, 21
3
b 32-35.
28. Ibid., IV, 7, 214a 1 7-2 14b H. Aristotle refutes
the Pythagorean cosmology in De Caelo II, 13.
29. Phy
s
.
IV, 9, 217b 22.
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iv. Time
Aristotle made two observations on the nature of time
which became basic to his theory: 1) time exists with
change, and 2) time is not movement but is dependent on
it.^ 1 Yet time cannot be identified with movement for two
reasons; i) there is or ly one time, but there are many move-
ments; and 2) time moves at one rate of speed, and cannot be
fast or slow, 3- hence, Aristotle argued, "Time is rot move-
ment, but only movement in so fer as it admits of enumera-
tion
.
"33
"how" is the measure of time; it maxes time both con-
tinuous and divided. It leads to continuity because all
"hows" are almost identical; yet "how" divides time Into two
infinities, the past and futune, ;4 Thus "how" is rot strict-
iy time, but an attribute of it.
v. llotion and the mover
In every process of movement, there must be that which
is potentially movable, and a mover. The mover Is not that
which car move, but that which actually does move.-^ Yet
it is impossible that the actualization of trie potentially
30. pkys
.
IV, 11, 213b 21
.
31 . TYTR. , IV, 1 1 , 2 1 3b 34.
32. Ibid., IV, 1C, 218b ir-19.
33. Ibid., IV, 11, 21pb 3-4. Crecae criticized this
conception of time because it does rot express duration. See
Y/olfson (tr. and ed
. ) , CCA, 97.
34. ghys , IV, 11, 2 Ipb 9-13.
35. Ibid . , IV, 11, 22Ca 21-23. The reason for this
statement is that time is continuous because it is dependent
on motion. "Row" is in a sense not continuous. Cf . ibid..,
IV, 11 , 219a 10-14.
36. Ibid., Ill, 2, 20 2a 16-17.
.
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movable end the action of the mover be different; their
actualization must be one,
7
' The complete actualization of
movement, however, is "unmovement ; therefore the mover
in Aristotle’s thought is an unmoved mover.
Aristotle’s concept of motion logically leads him to
the postulation of an unmoved Prime Mover. The argument in
summary is; actuality must precede potentiality; for noth-
ing is moved without a mover, and the mover is complete
actualization.^ Therefore, the ultimate cause of movement
is a complete actualization of movement, or a Prime Mover.
The Prime Mover may be characterized (in its relation
to motion) as ; i) unmoved, for the mover is the actualiza-
tion of movement; 2) eternal, for movement is eternal
3) one, for motion is continuous, and continuity involves
oneness 4) circular, for circularity is the primary kind
of movement, and orly circular movement can be continuous
and infinite;-' and c ) having no parts or magnitude, and
44located at the circumference of the world.
In summary, Aristotle’s concept of motion may be char-
37. Phys , III, 2, 202a 37. Gf . Meta . XII, 6, 1072 a 15
38. Gee supra, 57 #
39
.
geta
.
XII, 6, ’l07lb 18 -22 .
40
.
PTIys
.
VIII, 6, 259a 15.
41 . Ibid., VIII, 6, 2 59 * 17 .
42
.
Ibid., VIII, 7, 260b 1 5- 1 7
.
43. Ibid., VIII, 7, 261 a 27-26 1b 28.
44
.
Ibid., VIII, 10, 266b 25-27; 267b 5-8. Aristotle’
conception of the unmoved mover involved two premises which
he had to prove; 1) the mover must be moved as a whole
("according to its essence"), and 2) the principle of motion
must be within the object ("by its essence"). These prob-
lems have been answered by; 1) the definition of motion as
the actualization of the potentially movable, and 2) the
concept of the Prime Mover as the complete actualization
(Pure Form) of the potentially movable
.
..
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acterized thus: 1) motion is defined as the movement from
potentiality to actuality of the potentially movable;
2) motion is of three kinds, qualitative, quantitive, and
locomotion, of which locomotion is the most simple and pri-
ma ry ; 3) locomotion depends on Place for its existence;
4) the mover is ur moved, ^nd is the complete actualization
of the potential; and 5) ultimately, the primum motu m is
both the logical and temporal explanation of motion, in the
universe
.
.Aristotle's concept of motion stands in direct opposi-
tion to the theory of the "flux." By his theory, he con-
ceived of a universe which contains movement, but the source
of this movement is itself unmoved. Therefore, he held,
the universe is intelligible because it does cont.aii prin-
ciples of both motion and rest. The second problem is thus
to determine the object of knowledge in this universe.
4 c
2. The Object of Knowledge -
Substance for Aristotle is the primary category: those
categories other than Substance ^re "like ar offshoot and
accident of being. Subst^rce shows its priority ir three
ways
: t) because it can exist separately while the others
cannot; 2) because a definition must always include the def-
inition of the underlying substance; ^r.d 3) because a thing
4g. Aristotle recognized four objects of inquiry in
the "four causes:" material, formal, efficient, and final;
and three branches of study; things at rest, things in mo-
tion but indestructible, and destructible things. Cf. hys
.
II, 7, i°8a 25-31. This study is confined to esserce, how-
ever, because essence is the starting poirt of everything.
See below, 6 5.
46. Eta. Tic. I, 6 , 1C96a 22.
.
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Cl
is kr owr better when "what it is" is known before what Quali-
ty, Quantity, or Place it has. 4;
The mean in; of substance is "th^t which is neither Dredi
-
cable of a subject nor present ir a subject;" therefore, sub-
A Q
stance is the true object of knowledge. Yet this answer
was not sufficient for Aristotle: he proceeded to inquire
what ir. individual substances makes them substances.
i. Liatter and form
Every concrete thing in the universe, Aristotle held, is
40
a combination of matter and form. Th is distinctior between
fora end matter is one of the main tenets of philosophia
prima
;
for they re tvio correlates implied in reality in
every concrete individual, although they car be logically sep
arated and studied. Aristotle's analysis of reality thus
brought out three principles or points of view for study:
1) the matter, 2) the form, and 3) a compound of the two,
the ens
.
hatter qua matter is unknowable. It Is of two types;
1) perceptible, e. g., "bronze and wood and all matter that
is changeable;" and 2) intelligible, "that which is present
in perceptible things not qua perceptible, i. e. the objects
47. Yet a . vil, 1, t028a ir.-ir: 2.
43. 5iTrig., *5, 2a 12. Substance and essence are almost
synonomous terms, although there is a difference; substance
is an ontological term, essence is an epistemological term.
Thus, epistemologically speaking, essence is the true object
of knowledge. See below, 65-67.
47. Except God, who is Pure Form, and "active reason"
(discussed below, 74).
50. In Pays. I, Aristotle introduced privation - s a
third principle
. Yet he claimed that the introduction of
t^is pri> ciple is only a more minute discrimination. Ibid.,
I, 7 > 19GU 29.
..
.
.
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3 j
of mathematics."- Yet of these there is no definition;
"out they a re known by the aid of intuitive thinking or of
cp
perception
.
Matter cannot exist by itself, i. e.
,
there is no "pure
matter," nor can it be understood when taken out of its rela-
tivity to form. It can be characterized, however, as the
potential, imperfect, undefined, and indeterminate something
which is not actual and may not become so, but which is pre-
pared to pass into actuality when an energizing principle
e;-*
comes to aid.
Form, like matter, Aristotle considered to be neither
Produced nor made; only the concrete individual is produced.
Yet in Aristotle's hierarchy, matter is the inferior and form
r tr
the superior, - although neither of the two can escape its
c f?
relativeness. Tnis relation is, as Grote observed, that:
the Form stands first, the Matter second...
The Form is higher, grander, prior in dig-
nity and esteem, more Ens
,
or more nearly
approaching to perfect entity; the Matter
is lower, meaner, posterior in dignity,
farther removed from perf ec tion
.
57
51. Meta. VII, IP, 1036a p- 12 . Corresponding to sensi-
ble and intelligible matter are sensible and intelligible
forms. Tnis distinction, not important here, is discussed
below, ye
; 74.
52. Meta . VII, ip, 1036a 7.
53. Ibid. , IX, 2, 1050b 10-15. Thus, Aristotle dis-
tinguished’ types of matter: earth is not potentially * man
(ibid., IX, 7, 1038b 36). The matter for man is that which
will become a man when the form of man is imposed on it.
54. Ibid., VII, 8 , 10730 10.
55. In De Gen . An . I, 21 , 729a 1 3 — 1 5 , Aristotle com-
pares form and matter to male and female; the female (mat-
ter) is passive; the male is active, and the principle of
movement comes from him.
56. Meta . VII, 8, 1033b 19. This observation is direct-
ed against Plato's theory of substantial Ideas which exist in
the realm of being. See Meta
.
VII, 8, 1033b 1 f~ 1034 a 7 > f° r
the complete statement of this criticism. Aristotle held that
form cannot exist as a separate, substantial entity.
57 . Grote, ARI, 455.
.
VI. Aristotle's Reply to Phenomenal ism 6 5
The combination of form and matter constitutes tne con-
crete individual. Thus, for example, the form man, together
with the matter bones and flesh, constitutes a man:
And, when we have the whole, such and such
a form in this flesh and in these bones,
this is Callias or Socrates; and they are
different in virtue of their matter (for
that is different), but the same in form;
for their form is indivisible
.
r
Thus, Aristotle held, there is no need to assume the Platonic
Idea as an example or form; for a man is sufficient within
himself to be " formed-ma tter
,
The probabilities as to tiie nature of substance are
three: 1) either substance is form, or 2) it is matter, or
3) it is a unity of form and matter, i. e., the concrete
individual. It remains, therefore, to determine the exact
object of knowledge.
ii. Essence
To know a thing, Aristotle held, is to know its essence;
and both the definition of a thing and its essence belong
primarily to substance. 1 Furthermore, substance is the same
as its essence/'^ Therefore, Aristotle concluded, substance
(i. e., essence) is the primary subject of Inquiry for,
"as in syllogisms, substance is the starting-point of every-
thing
.
58. Meta . VII, 8, 1034a. 5-8.
59. Ibid. , VII, 8, 1034a 1-3. Another criticism of
the Ideas is given below, 66.
60. Meta
.
VII, 6, 1031b 18-22.
61 . Told . , VII, 4, 1030b 5.
62. Ibid., VII, 6, 1032a 5-10. The distinction between
substance and essence is that substance is subject in an onto
logical sense, while essence is subject in an epistemological
sen se
.
63. Ibid., XII, 1, 1069a 18.
64. Ibid., VII, o, 1034b 30-31.
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3efore he attempted to define essence accurately,
Aristotle considered the characteristics which essence must
contain. First, he held that essence must in some way exist
before the concrete individual, for "it is impossible that
anything should be produced if there were nothing existing
before."'' Secondly, it seems impossiole that essence should
be destroyed; essence must be eternal. a If essence is con-
tingent, both Heraclitus and Protagoras were right,"'
Thirdly, essence must be simple. Violation of this postu-
6 Plate, Aristotle held,'- has led certain thinkers (Platonists
)
6c
to lormulate a. realm of substantial Ideas which constitutes
the essence of contingent things. But this view must also
postulate an infinite number of Ideas to explain generation
70
and destruction, and is therefore unsatisfactory.
Fourthly, Aristotle held that essence must be both of
the universal and the form: essence is not essence unless
it so nehow expresses the universal; and unless form is irclud-
»7p
ed
,
essence means nothing because matter is unknowable
,
1
c
65. Ex nihilo nihil fit . ’.let
a
.
VII, 7, 1032b 30.
66. Ibid., VIII, S, 1043b 13-23. Concerning the es-
sence of destructible things, Aristotle held that perhaps the
things formed in nature are not substances at all, and that
nature is the only substance of "natural things." however,
s ee below
,
6P
.
67. Supra, 44.
68. I leta . VII, 14, 1033a 24-103?b 16.
69. dote that in Plato’s last period of development,
the Ideas lose much of their substantiality and separate
existence. Supra, 38.
70. This is the meaning of the famous "third man" argu-
ment. It is often accredited to Aristotle, but was first
formulated by the Sophist Polyxenus. See Gomperz, GT , III,
132, for a discussion of Aristotle’s use of the argument, as
well p.8 for references given there.
71 . beta . VII, 1 1 , 1036a 2?
.
72. TTF7 supra, 63.
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Fifthly, essence must be krowable. Definition is the ra- -
73tional explanation or formula of essence, and Aristotle
held that essence can be apprehended by human, reason and
expressed in terms of a definition.' 4
Aristotle first considered matter as constituting es-
sence. But matter qua essence does not meet the requirements
for essence, for matter is unknowable per se
,
i. e.
,
complete-
7rly without form. Furthermore, the very concept of matter
excludes universality and form, and therefore matter cannot
be essence. Form, on the otner hand, violates the postula-
tion concerning the simplicity of essence; and, as Aristotle
observed;
so to reduce all things thus to forms and to
eliminate the matter is useless labour; for
some things surely are a particular form in
a particular matter.^ or particular things in
a particular state. ?6
The universal had been considered essence by many of
Aristotle's predecessors. But this identification is unac-
ceptable. First, the essence of a thing is that which is
peculiar to it, but a universal is common because it can be
applied to more than one thing. 77 Secondly, substance means
that which is not predicable of a subject, but a universal
o
is predicable of some subject always. Furthermore, no
universal is a concrete object: no "animal" exists apart
73. Meta . VII, 4, 1031a 14.
74. This is possible because Aristotle was an epis-
temological monist. See below, 7 4 .
75. Ret
a
.
VII, 10, 1036a p.
76. Ibid. , VII, 11, 1036b' 22 “2 4
.
77. Ibid., VII, 13, 1033b 10-11. Cf. supra, 66 • This
statement may seem to be a contradiction to Aristotle's ear-
lier consideration. His meaning here, however, seems to be
that essence is universal, but" the univers-1 is not essence.
73. Meta . VII, 13, 1033b 15.
..
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from particular- Air. cs of animal. 15 Therefore, no universal
can be a substance, for a universal indicates a "such," r.ot
a "this." 80
Aristotle proposed to confine himself to perceivable
Si
essences which are recognized by all, 1 ow sensible objects
always include matter, and therefore matter must be essence
82 ,in one way, ' In another way, the form must be essence be-
83
cause it does express a certain universality. And ag 1 in,
the combination of form and matter expresses esserce in a
certain manner- because it is capable of existing separably
°4in an aosolute sense. Thus, sensible esserce consists in
gc
actuality" '--in the concrete object wnich is a combination
86
of form and matter.
The essence of sensible objects, however, is imperfect,
and it is, therefore, not the only essence which Aristotle
recognized. The sensible essence is perishable because it
does contain natter
7a
But there is an imperishable essence
9. -eta. VII, 13, 1038b 33.
80. ToTc
r
., VII, 13, 1039a 16. Aristotle recognized
that this statement involved a problem: how can an essence
be defined if it is not a universal in any sense (ibid., VII,
13, 1039a 15-23)? His concept of essence is designed to
answer this problem.
81. Ibid., VIII, 1, 1042a 26.
82. Ibid., VIII, 1, 1042a 33.
83. Ibid., VIII, 1, 1042a 29.
84. Ibid., VIII, 1, 1042a 31.
85. Cf. De An . II, 1, 412a 22.
86. This statement emphasizes the theory behind Aris-
totle's emphasis on scientific observation. The objects of
knowledge are not in a realm of Ideas, but, at least as far
as sensible essences are concerned, are known by studying
the world of nature. This stands in direct opposition to
Plato's view that the senses hinder the soul in its search
for true being. Cf . supra, 77, n. 32; 37,
87. Veta. VIII, 1, 1042b 7. A s’ecorid "movable essence" 1
in addition To the sensible is the "intelligible esserce."
This is discussed below, 74.
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of pure actuality which is prior to all potentiality. The
Unmoved Mover is the pure essence or substance of the uni-
verse; and it is this concept which is a direct refutation
of Heraclitus' "flux."°^
The concept of essence provided Aristotle with a uni-
verse which could be rationally described because it con-
tains principles both of motion and rest; and because essence
exists in this universe. Thus it remained for Aristotle's
final refutation of phenomenalism to give a description of
the psychological processes by which men can get accurate
knowledge of this universe.
3. Sensation and Knowledge
Aristotle began his study of the soul by recognizing
that a simple definition of the soul would rot rive a suf-
COficient account of the varieties of its manifestations;'
yet there is an essential nature of the soul which is com-
mon to all, and this essence is the object of the investiga-
o ition
.
The soul, the essence of all living things, is
defined as "an actuality or formulable essence of something
co
that possesses a potentiality of being besoulecl ; "" i. e.,
of a natural body furnished with organs. A living thing,
therefore, consists of both body and soul, and the question
8°. Aristotle's argument for the existence of a prime
mover is given supra, 6o-6l.
89 . I. e., the Unmoved Mover is not in the phenomenal
world. For a statement of the problem of the "flux," see
supra, ro
oo
,
t)e An. I, 1, 402b 5-7.
91. Told-, I, 1 , 402b 23-25.
92 . Ibid., II, 2 , 4 14a 26-27.
.t
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whether they are one or two is meaningless.
Livifcg may mean thinking, perception, loc^l movement,
04
or growth ^nd decay;'
'
yet the power of self-nutrition can
O cbe isolated from the other powers, but not they from it."
The nutritive faculty is therefore the minimum element of
the soul, for its possession "leads us to speak of things
06
as living at- all,"' and it is common to all living things.
i. Sensation
The possession of sensation, of which the simplest and
most common form is touch, is the faculty which separates
the animal and vegetable kingdoms,^' The power of sensation
belongs to the sensible faculty of the soul.
Aristotle considered sensation to be essentially a proc-
ess of actualization which depends on movement or affection
08
from without. The potentiality of the sensible is two-
fold.: 1) the object is potentially capable of being sensed,
and 2) the sense organ which has tne power of sensation is
oc
potentially like what the sensed object is actually, 77 In
the process of actualization, the sense organ receives the
100
sensible forms of things without the matter.
93 . De An . II, 1, 412b 5-7.
04. T'bi&T , II, 2, 413 ^ 24 -25 .
05. Ibid., II, 2, 413 * 31 -33 .
05, Ibid., II, 2 , 413b 2. lote that Aristotle’s study
of the soul included all living things, both plants and ani-
m a 1 s .
07, Ibid., II, 2, 413b 1-4. Aristotle held that cona-
tion arises from this sense. Ibid., II, 3, 414b 4.
07 Ibid.
,
II, 5 , 41
6
b 34.
00
,
Ibid. II, 5 , 4 1 Sa 3-4.
ICC
.
Ibid. II, 12 , 424a 1 8 . Also included ir the sens!
ble faculti^ of the soul are memory and imagination. See be
I.Iem . et Rem
., 1, 440b f45la 19; and D e Spin . , 1, 459^ t“25 .
.
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There are three kinds of sensible objects; 1 ) those
which ore perceptible to one sense, 2 ) those which ore com-
mon to many senses, and 3 ) the incidental objects of serse.
Only the first type of object "constitutes the object of
101
sense in the strictest sense of the term."
Aristotle’s conception of the mechanisms of sensation
is monistic despite the fact that he considered a medi-
um necessary for the actualization of sensation; for the
process of sensation involves only one actualization--it is
but one fact. Therefore, Aristotle stood in direct op-
position to Protagoras’ theory of perception; the senses
can and do give accurate information of the external world
105
qua sensible objects; and there is no Impassible barrier
betv.een the receiving mind and the object.
‘.ris to tie held that there are only five special senses
;
touch, sight, taste, smell, and hearing. Bey or d these there
are no niore. Yet there is no special sense-organ^' for
108
the "common sensibles," e. g
. ,
movement. The existence
of a special organ, however, is unnecessary; "there is al-
ready in us a general sensibility [["common sense"J which
enables us to perceive them directly."
101. D e An . II, 6, 4l8a 6-25.
102. Aris totl e was epistemologically monistic. See
below, 74 .
103. See, e. g., his discussion of hearing, De An II,
8 , 420a 3-I 9 .
104
.
Ibid., Ill, 2 , 425b 26. The only distinction that
can be made here is the difference between, e. g., physical
and psychological sound. Yet they do not exist separately;
they are merely different Ways of looking at one actuality.
105. Ibid., II, 5 , 418a 15 -I 6 .
106. Ibid., Ill, 1 , 424b 20 .
1 07
.
The sense and its organ are the same in fact, but
their essence is different. The organ is spatial, but the
sensation is not. See ibid., II, 12 , 424a 25 .
108. Ibid., Ill, 1 , 4240 14.
109. Ibid., Ill, 1 , 424b 28-22.
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The functions of the common perceptive faculty are four-
fold: 1 ) to perceive the "common sensibles ,
"
2 ) to per-
ceive the "incidental sensibles," i. e., a patch of white is
inown to be Cleon's son
,
111
3 ) to perceive a perception,
i. e., to be aware of a sensation, 112 and 4) to discrimi-
nate between the objects of two senses ,
^
1 ;
ii. Thought
The ancients (including Protagoras), Aristotle held,
identified thinking and perceiving ,
^
1
^ but they could not
account for error, They were thus left with a dilemma:
"either (t) whatever seems is true (and tnere are some who
accept this) or ( 2 ) error is contact with the unlike ; for
that is the opposite of the knowing of like by like.” But
1 V
Doth error and knowledge do exist in respect to contraries,.
Yet it is impossible that perceiving and thinking should
be identical, first, because perceiving is universal in the
animal world while thinking is found only in a small division
1
1
P
of it; and secondly, speculative thinking is distinct from
perceiving because it deals with rightness and wrongness,
1 1C. Re An
.
III
, 1 , 425* 27
.
111. Ibid.
,
Ill
,
1
,
425a 25 .
1 12. Ibid . Ill, 2, 42 c ^ 12-2B. This passage concerns
trie diffi cul ties of self-consciousness
;
yet Aristotle ap-
parently did not assign the "commor sense" the function of
self-identification. This function seems to involve both
the sensible and rational elements of the soul
.
in. Ibid . HI, 2 , 426b 16-427* 14.
114. Ibid . III, 3 , 427* 22.
1 IB. Ibid. Ill, 3 , 427'D 1 .
116. Ibid. Ill, 3 , 427b 2-4.
117. Ibid . , Ill, 3 , 427b 5 .
1
1
S. Ibid
.
Ill, 3 , 427b 8 .
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while perception of the special objects of sense is always
free from error, Thinking, therefore, is different fro
perceiving, and consists partly of imagination, partly of.
j udgm en t
.
Imagination is not sense for the following reasons: 1 '-^
t) sense is either a faculty or an activity, while imagina-
tion takes place in the absence of both; 2) sense is always
present, imagination is not; 3) sensations qua sensations
are always true, imaginations are usually f.lse; 4) imagina-
tion does not function with sensation unless there is a fail-
ure in the exercise of the sense; and 5) visions appear even
when the eyes are shut. Furthermore, imagination carrot be
confused with opinion because: 1) opinion involves belief,
and brutes have imagination but ro belief; and 2) every opin-
ion is accompanied by conviction gained through reason, but
brutes do not have reason. Imagination, therefore, can be
neither sensation nor opinion, ror a state compounded from
them
.
Yet imagination is in some sense dependent or sensation
1 22because it is a movement. Of the three types of sensa-
1 23
tior.
,
' error can occur only in trie comparison of sensible
124
qualities and in the perceptioi of universal attributes.
But if "imagination presents no other features than those
enumerated and is as v^e have described, then imagination must
1 19
.
Be An
.
HI, 3 > 427° O- 13.
120
.
Ibid.
,
III, 3 > 428a 5- 17.
121 . I bid . , HI, 3, or -428o
1 72
.
Ibid. III, 3, 42?b 10 -17.
123. See supra, 171 .
124. Be An . HI, 3> 42°o 25 -3C.
•.
'
.
.
.
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be a movement resulting from an actual exercise of a power of
<i 1 orsense
.
" 1 --
The thinking part of the soul, Aristotle helc
,
while im-
passible, must be capable of receiving the form of an object,
i. e.
,
that it oust be potentially identical wil the object,
"hind must be related to what is thinkable, as sense is to
^ p~,
what is sensible." But, if the mind is only potential
until it thinks, it is nothing;^' and therefore Aristotle
wa s forced to distinguish between active and passive
reason
.
Everything in nature contains two factors, matter and
form, and these elements must also be found in the soul. *9
Passive mind is the matter of the soul, for it is only a
potentiality, i. e., it contains the forms of intelligible
objects potentially. J Active mind, however, is separable,
impassible, unmixed, for its essential nature is activity.
It is the form of thinking.
Aristotle's epistemological monism is very clear in his
conception of knowledge . Actual knowledge is identical with
its object; potential knowledge in the individual is prior
to actual knowledge, "but in the universe it has no priority
even in time; for all things that come into being arise from
what actually is."”*^
Error, Aristotle held, "always involves a synthesis."
1 or
i — •
De An. Ill, 3> 42 8b 3 1 ~429 a 7.
126
.
TBIdT, III, 4, 429 a 17.
127. I bid . , III
,
4, 429a 24.
12?. Aristotle did rot write of an "active reason" al-
though he did mention "passive reason."
129 . De An. III, 5 , 430 a 1C-13.
13°
.
"¥TncC is the form of forms." Ibid., Ill, 8, 432a 2.
131 . Ibid .
,
Ill, 5, 430 a ]'7 .
132. Ibid . Ill, 7, 431 a 1-3.
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It is found only where objects of thought are put together in
a quasi-unity. Error- cannot occur in either sensation or
knowledge qua sensation or knowledge:
Assertion is the saying of something con-
cerning something, e. g. affirmation, and
is in every case either true or false: this
is not always the case with mind; the think-
ing of the definition in the sense of consti-
tutive essence is never in error nor is it
the assertion of something concerning some-
thing, but, just as while the seeing of a
special object of sight c^n never be in error,
the belief that the white object seen is a
man may be mistaken, so too in the case of
objects which are without natter . *33
iii. Rksumfe of sensa tion and knowledge*"^
The soul is in a way all existing, for existing things
are either sersible or thinkable; sensation is in a w».y
what is sensible, and knowledge is in a way what is knowable.
The problem has been to determine in what w^y.
Knowledge and sensation »re divided to correspond with
reality; potential sensation and knowledge answers to po-
tentialities, actual sensation and knowledge answers to
actualities. Within the soul the faculties of knowledge and
sensation are potentially these objects, i. e., the forms of
these objects ^re present. Yet because there is nothing
separate from spatial magnitudes, the objects of thought are
in sensible forms. 135 Therefore, nothing can be learned in
133
.
ge _ An
.
Ill, 6, 430b 26-30.
134. This s,, ry is found in ibid.. Ill, 8, 431b 20-
432 a 14 .
135. See supra, 6°> especially r. 86. Note that in
Plato's fir.^1 period of development, during which Aristotle
was his student, there is an increasing emphasis or the value
of experience. Supra, 3P
.
..
:
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the absence of sense; and the mind is always aware of an
image when it thinks, for images are like sensuous objects
except that they contain no matter. Yet a concept is not an
image even though concepts necessarily involve them.
4. The Final Rebuttal of Phenomenalism
Aristotle's criticisms of homo m ensure, omnium brought
out several problems which he had to answer to overthrow the
formula. His rebuttal may be summarized thus;
1 ) Mature is a principle of movement, but all movement
is ultimately derived from an unmoved mover. Therefore,
the universe is not one of complete "flux" as his interpreta-
tion of Heraclitus' theory maintained.
2) The ultimate object of knowledge is indestructible
essence, which is pure actuality. Thus the universe is in-
telligible, for it contains principles both of motion and rest.
3) Sensation is a Process of actualization, and is
menistic in character; therefore there can be no error in-
sensation .
4) Thinking is also p process of actualization; and
Aristotle's epistemology is monistic. Frror occurs only
when objects are not unified. Any attempt to reduce knowl-
edge to sensation removed the possibility of an explanation
of error, and leads only to irreconcilable difficulties.
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CONCLUSION
Phenomenalism a s a theory in Greek philosophy was first
formulated by Protagor-s in his famous dictum, homo mensura
omnium
.
Plato and Aristotle interpreted the doctrine as
meaning that knowledge consists in sensible perception; and
they believed that the saying was based on the theory of
universal "flux" formulated by Heraclitus, although they
misinterpreted the meaning of Logos
.
Both Plato and Aristotle
rejected phenomenalism.
Plato's criticisms and rejection of phenomenalism may
be summarized thus:
1) Phenomenalism confuses sensation with opinion and
knowledge, and thus denies the possibility of attaining truth.
2) Sensation qua sensation is infallible; yet the theory
that knowledge is perception makes a rational explanation of
error impossible, for perceptions make contradictory claims
concerning the object to which they refer.
3) The theory of the "flux" makes knowledge impossible,
for if there is to be knowledge, the universe must contain
principles of both motion and rest.
4) Mind is the only immediate reality known to men;
yet the theory of Protagoras makes mind non-existent. The
senser and the sensed come together only to generate sersa-
..
•
-
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tions, and neither the mind or the object is real.
5) The realm of Ideas fulfills the ontological func-
tion of constituting the eternal, immutable principles in
the universe, and the epistemological function of being the
objects of thought.
The conclusions of Aristotle’s criticisms of phenomenal-
ism may be summarized thus;
1) The Laws of Contradiction and Excluded Iliddle are
the principle of thought ar.d being. Protagoras and Heraclitus
denied these laws, and thereby eliminated the possibility of
definition
.
2 ) The theory of the "flux" denies the possibility of
knowledge and makes the understanding of error impossible;
yet there are principles of rest in the universe, and knowl-
edge is taerefore possible.
3) Protagoras’ theory confused sensation and knowledge,
and percepta and entia
.
To confuse sensation and knowledge
leads to irreconcilable difficulties, for sensation is in-
fallible and yet error exists. Error can result only from
an improper union of a form of the mind and a form from an
object. The confusion of perc ep ta and entia does not account
for the true nature of entia
,
for there is more to entia
than what is given in sensation.
4) Ha ture is a principle of movement, but the source
of all movement is itself unmoved. The universe does obey
the laws of thought and is therefore intelligible.
.a
.
.
.
.
.
*
Conclusion
5) The object of knowledge is essence, which is actu-
ality. The ultimate substance of the universe is eternal,
immutable Pure Actuality.
6) Knowledge of the universe is possible because the
mind is "the form of forms;" Aristotle was an epistemological
monist, and the actualization of the object ar.d the thought
constitutes but one fact.
*-
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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this thesis is to present a concentra-
ted study of tne Platonic and Aristotelian theories of epis-
temology and metaphysics in their relationship to the doc-
trine of phenomenalism.
Phenomenalism is the theory which limits all knowledge
and reality to phenomena, although the term has also been
applied to such systems as those of Kant, Comte, and Spencer,
which limit knowledge to phenomena though the reality of a
thing-in-i tself is not denied.
As a Greek doctrine, phenomenalism w^s formulated by
Protagoras ir. his famous saying, homo men sura, omnium . lie
arrived at this conclusion because of his theory of percep-
tion: between the knower and the object are the senses;
therefore, ro one can know reality, and no one has the right
to contradict the opinion of another. The humanist Schiller
has interpreted the saying as meaning that truth is a func-
tion of each situation and each personality.
Plato identified the dictum with the theory that knowl-
edge is sensible perception. He considered the saying to be
based on a perverted interpretation of Heraclitus’ ’’flux:”
Plato did not interpret Logos adequately. His arguments
against Protagoras' saying were: 1) phenomenalism so defined
.'
-
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confuses sensation with opinion and. knowledge; it denies
the infallibility of sensation and leads to irreconcilable
contradictions. 2) The extreme interpretation of the
"flux" does away with species and genera, making knowledge
impossible. 3) In Protagoras' theory, mind--man , s only
immediately-known reality--loses its identity; mind and
object come together orly to generate sensations, and they
have no absolute existence. 4) Knowledge is not true
opinion because knowledge qua knowledge involves no error,
while error occurs frequently in opinion.
Plato's epi stemolog
v
is based upon the furdaoei tal dis-
tinction between appearance and reality. Sensation, which
Is with appearance, is infallible j but is useful only .
it serves as reference for reason. Opii ion, which also
deals with appearance, is the combination of sensation and
knowledge. The method ir opinion is hypothetical, and is
the method of the sciences. Mathematics, uowever, is unique
in that it lies between the world of sense and reality.
In the realm of knowledge it is necessary to consider
the development in Plato's thought. In his early period
( Ileno ) , Plato taught 0 psychological, a priori knowledge.
In the second period ( Symposium , Phaed o, Republic ) , how-
ever, knowledge is gained by intuition, and is based on
a principle which is above all doubt. In Later Platonism
( Sophist , Laws , Phil ecu s) the emphasis or ratioral intui-
tion disappeared, and knowledge became a coherent body of
judgments. The object of knowledge is the realm of Ideas,
-
Abstract
which are the eternal, immutable essences of contingent
things
.
Plato's theory of Ideas fulfilled the ontological func-
tion of providing a universe which contains principles of
rest; and an epistemological function in that the Ideas are
the objects of knowledge.
Aristotle's interpretation of the homo men sura formula
followed essentially Plato's analysis of the saying. His
rejection of phenomenalism consisted of two parts; i) a
defense of the Laws of Contradiction and Excluded Middle;
and 2 ) a statement of the manner in which the thought of
Heraclitus and Protagoras violated these laws.
t) The Laws of Contradiction pnd Excluded Middle are
the first principles of demonstration, even though they can-
not be demonstrated positively. Yet they are more self-
evident than any other truth, and they cannot be denied with
out being affirmed.
2) Heraclitus' "flux" (as Aristotle interpreted it)
denied the ontological implications of the Law of Contradic-
tion, for all subjects contain *11 predicates. Protagoras'
dictum violated the law because it failed to distinguish be-
tween thinking and sensation, and between percepta and en t i
a
Sensation itself is infallible; error involves a synthesis
of thought and sensation. Furthermore, the confusion of
percepta and entia does not accourt for the true nature of
entia
,
for there is more to entia than what is given ir sen-
sation
.
.'
.
,
.
.
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Aristotle's reply to phenomenal ism consisted of three
parts. First, his concept of movement as the actualization
of the potentially movable involved the postulation of an
unmoved mover who is ultimately responsible for all movement
in the universe. Secondly, the concept of essence, which is
defined as actuality, provided him with an object of knowl-
edge which is not in raotior. These two concepts provided
Aristotle with a universe which is intelligible because it
contains principles of both motion and rest. Thirdly, knowl-
edge of this universe is possible because the knowing process
is monistic, i. e.
,
the actualization of a thought and the
intelligible form of an ooject corstitutes one fact.
The conclusions of this study are:
1) Both Plato and Aristotle recognized that an attempt
to reduce knowledge to sensation leads only to contradictions
and makes the explanation of error impossible.
2) Both philosophers held that the universe must con-
tain principles of motion and rest.
3) Both men held that mind is irreducible to any other
metaphysical reality, and that the mind can and does attain
knowledge
.
4) Plato answered the problems of phenomenalism by
positing a realm of eternal, immutable Ideas. Aristotle, how
ever, criticized the Ideas because they do not explain mo-
tion, and because an Infinite number of Ideas is needed to
explain the sensible world. The concept of essence provided
the object of knowledge for Aristotle.
... .
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